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APPLYING SOCIAL NORMS

in Anti-Corruption Programming



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shortenings

ACORN	Anti-Corruption in Nigeria Programme
ANEEJ	Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice
ASI	Adams Smith International
CAR	Central African Republic
CBOs	community-based organisations
CDIC	Central Discipline Inspection Commission
CJL	Corruption, Justice and Legitimacy
CJS	Criminal justice system
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CSOs	Civil society organisations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DFID	Department for International Development
IDIs	In-depth interviews
FBOs	community-based organisations
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
FGD	Focus group discussion
FWSC	Fair Wages and Salaries Commission
GACP	Global Anti-Corruption Programme
GI-ACE	Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence
GUSS	Ghana Universal Salary Structure
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission
KAP	Knowledge, attitude and practice
MANTRA	Monitoring of Recovered Assets in Nigeria through Transparency and Accountability
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NACS	National Anti-Corruption Strategy
NCTP	National Cash Transfer Programme
NFIU	Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NOA	National Orientation Agency
OGP	Open Government Partnership
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act
PWDs	Persons with Disabilities
SCRAP-C	Strengthening Citizen's Resistance against Prevalence of Corruption
SDGs	Sustainable Development goals
SERAP	Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project
SRO	Senior Responsible Owner
SSSS	Single Spine Salary Structure
TI	Transparency International
TACS	The Anti-Corruption Superheroes
TOC	Theory of change
UK	United Kingdom
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
VFM	Value for money
YAF	Youth Alive Foundation

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Rev. David Ugolor
Executive Director

Executive Summary

Introduction

The Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice, with support of the United Kingdom's Department for International Development commissioned this project, 'Applying Social Norms in Anti-corruption Programming'. It was inspired by the increasing centrality of social norms in achieving sustained change in behaviour towards corruption. The broad objective of the study was to examine the effectiveness of the social norms-based approaches to anti-corruption as applied by the principal partners under ACORN. The research project was implemented in three components, using a combination of desk research and interviews as a methodological tool. Initial results of the project were submitted as progress reports 1, 2 and 3. This final report is divided into four parts.

Part I introduces the entire report, and presents the revised report of the desk research entitled 'From theory to praxis: Catalysing change in the social norms of corruption'. It gives a lens through two theoretical models in anti-corruption programming: the 'principal-agent' and 'collective action', as well as the reference group, social normative pressures, and systems-thinking. Conceptual review was further complemented with empirical literature on social norms and corruption. Apart from the social norms approach, five cases on the application of social norms in anti-corruption are presented.

Part II discusses the scoping study, revised as 'DFID's ACORN and its social norms interventions'. It gives a background to ACORN, and presents details of the interviews with partners pertaining to policy framework; assumptions of the projects; activities, methods and tools; anticipated outcomes; barriers and risks; key influencers; as well as coordination and partners' consideration. The major partners covered are ActionAid Nigeria, ANEEJ, SERAP and YAF.

Part III is a review of ACORN's monitoring and evaluation framework as it affects the social norms component. Central to the review is the 'theory of change', which is often explained by the monitoring and evaluation plan, strategy or system. It also discusses the British principle of 'value for money' through the 4Es - 'economy', 'efficiency', 'effectiveness', and 'equity'. ACORN's M&E related tasks were reviewed under the following streams: 'conceptualisation', 'guiding framework', 'baselines and milestones', 'effectiveness', 'accountability', 'lessons', 'social norms component' 'relationship between projects', 'coordination', 'sustainability', and 'consideration by partners'.

Part IV provides a general conclusion of the report. First, it draws lessons from social norms application in anti-corruption, using evidence and practice. Second, it draws key messages on ACORN and its social norms from the scoping study. Third, it summarises the findings from the review of ACORN's M&E. Also, it submits proposals for further programming in ACORN, future M&E activities, and further research.

Lessons from Social Norms

Application in Anti-Corruption

- 1 There are obvious limitations and frustrations in the current state of literature on social norms and corruption. Thus the literature is in search of improvements for the purpose of clarifying key concepts and integrating the salient points into programming.
- 2 The social norms approach, though distinct, forms an integral part of the entire anti-corruption strategies, such as rule-changing, enforcement, transparency, organisational and managerial reforms, as well as social accountability.
- 3 There are possible consequences in ignoring social norms in anti-corruption programming. First, it could undermine the positive momentum generated by good work in other fields. Second, it could boomerang, thereby worsening corruption itself. Third, it could endanger people's lives.
- 4 There are harsher sanctions in developing countries and FCAS. The mentality, "us vs. them" is being solidified among groups due to conflict. This breeds distrust, fear and, at the extreme, dehumanisation of the "other".
- 5 Common sanctions for breaching social norms include ostracisation, harm to reputation, and diminished support. Therefore, the groups responsible for sanctioning individuals need to be addressed, so as to turn the sanctions against the perpetrators of the norms of corruption.
- 6 It is important to engage with people at a young age when they are beginning to "form" social norms to internalise them. However, social norms vary from context to context based on one's social group, cues in the environment, and expectations about what is typical and appropriate based on those cues.
- 7 There are lessons in building, breaking and shifting a norm. Building a new norm can often be easier and more strategic than attempting to dismantle a harmful one. Shifting associated norms will be easier by breaking one norm.
- 8 The potential of social norms to serve as a driver or an influencer of corrupt behaviour depends on the context, including the form of corruption being considered. This is supported by the established norms in different contexts.
- 9 Attitudes and behaviors are commonly mistaken for social norms. These are different types of change, and thus require different strategies if interventions are to be effective.
- 10 The social norms approach is intended to relieve and shift social norms, and enable the effectiveness of other interventions, such as codes of conduct, salary increases, legal reform, enforcement, and civil society oversight.
- 11 Social norms change is said to have occurred even with interventions that focus solely on measuring and changing individual attitudes or beliefs. This is called a mismatch in social norms application.

Key messages on ACORN's work on social norms



1. Most of the policy documents guiding ACORN also guide the project implementation by partners, but individual partners also support their work with internal policies.
2. It will take a long time to change the social norms of corruption in Nigeria, particularly because it requires collective action. Thus the five-year period would be insufficient to achieve identifiable change in social norms.
3. All partners' projects are directed at achieving the overall goal of ACORN, namely: to reduce corruption in Nigeria, in view of its impact on development. Also, the partners' projects are national in coverage.
4. All assumptions of partners' projects point to the pervasiveness corruption in Nigeria, and most assumptions are being proven right in the course of implementation.
5. ACORN's principal partners agree on the fact that collective action is needed to succeed, and their interventions have been designed in furtherance of this.
6. A long-term objective of DFID's ACORN programme is the anticipation that anti-corruption becomes a norm.
7. ACORN partners use a range of activities to drive their projects. These include engagement, monitoring, advocacy, training, policy dialogue, town hall meetings, dissemination events, public lectures, research, reporting, advocacy, capacity building, and project management.
8. There are similarities in the methods and tools being deployed. However, DFID did not suggest any methods and tools due to a deficit of expertise on social norms and the novel nature of the social norms aspect of the ACORN programme.
9. Although ACORN is still at the information stage, progress has been made in creating accountability hurdles by DFID. The project partners have also recorded a number of progress in implementation.
10. ACORN encounters a lot of barriers and risks. In response, DFID does not engage politically, but responds at the programmatic level to avoid diplomatic row due to lobbying, and supports strong advocacy and reputational scrutiny. The project partners also adopt a number of measures to address the barriers and mitigate risks.
11. Citizens have the power to decide what behaviour they want to adopt. However, the successful implementation of the projects by partners is partly attributed to key influencers in the media (conventional and social), moral institutions (traditional rulers and religious leaders), as well as town and gown (academia).
12. The principal partners under the ACORN include ActionAid Nigeria, ANEEJ, SERAP, and YAF. Others are UNODC and Adams Smith International. However, the principal partners engage second-tier partners in their various ACORN projects.



Summary of Findings of ACORN's M&E

1. The GACP Business Case by Prosperity Fund emphasises the place of social norms in changing attitudes of citizens towards accepting corrupt practices. This also shows in DFID's conceptualisation of ACORN, and it cuts across ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C, ANEEJ's MANTRA, SERAP's Nigeria Anti-Corruption Social Norms Project, and YAF's Y-PAC.
2. ACORN's M&E framework is majorly guided by the TOC and a logical framework, and inspired by the principle of 'value for money' or 4Es - 'economy', 'efficiency', 'effectiveness', and 'equity'. However, there has been a shift in focus to capture, document and report specific changes in social norms on corruption.
3. At the inception of the ACORN programme, the baselines for most of the projects were zero. From the milestones, implementation of the individual projects is expected to contribute to the overall goal of ACORN. However, ACORN creates room for partners to set yearly targets, which may be different from the milestones derived from the logical framework and the baseline.
4. ACORN has undergone a number of iterations of the logical framework, in view of the fact that an M&E system is not cast in stone. However, there are some gaps in the ACORN logical framework.
5. Accountability is guaranteed in the various projects with full implementation of the M&E of ACORN.
6. However, it is the responsibility of implementing partners to ensure the use of the M&E, which is a mere document.
7. An intriguing aspect of ACORN's M&E pertains to the numerous lessons documented thus far. However, the lessons show the need to expand the ACORN programme through additional support to the downstream partners.
8. DFID's ACORN has an M&E framework that partly captures social norms, particularly at the topmost level. However, some of the project partners are in search of improvement to ensure more qualitative indicators and data collection tools.
9. There is a relationship between the projects under the ACORN programme as evidenced in joint programming. DFID has retained the services of Itad to ensure a functional relationship amongst the partners, which would extend to second-tier partners.
10. As part of coordination, there is a steering committee meeting of the ACORN programme, wherein critical decisions are taken. However, some partners are of the opinion that no practical coordination exists amongst the ACORN partners.
11. Anti-corruption is already being diffused into the activities of the project partners under ACORN. For example, MANTRA by ANEEJ and SCRAP-C by ActionAid Nigeria have been developed as specific brands. In particular, MANTRA by ANEEJ is working towards periodic measures for long-term changes in social norms.
12. Top consideration by project partners pertains to the holding of quarterly M&E meetings within a project, as well as bi-annual meetings programme-wide. This would create room for knowledge sharing on how to address potential challenges and scale-up on achievements.

Proposals for further programming in ACORN

1. Efforts should be made to delete all forms of inertia in the ACORN society component, with more attention given to the youths.
2. Cooperation between ACORN partners should be enhanced through periodic review meetings that will be held twice a year.
3. Partners should also be encouraged to work together in the area of data generation to inform their social norms-based interventions.
4. Programmatic activities with a percentage for collaboration before approval by DFID is another way of enhancing cooperation between partners.
5. Partners should deploy more efforts towards involving social networks in their interventions. This is because of the potential of a network to enhance messages that would resonate with the people, and serve as reference group.
6. Partners should push for legal reforms that would validate social rejection of corruption. By implication, the legal validation of social rejection would drive individuals far away from corrupt tendencies.
7. Partners should be involved in design of future programme design. This will shed light on the realities of implementing social norms interventions, compared to theories and assumptions.
8. Consideration should be given to extending the life of ACORN, especially its society component. As observed in the field, changing social norms takes generation. A five-year project will not be enough to address this issue. It must be consistent for a relatively longer period of time.



Proposals for future M&E activities

1. Targeted stakeholders should be involved in the design of future M&E activities of ACORN. This should include local CSOs, moral institutions, and relevant anti-corruption agencies.
2. ACORN's future M&E framework should be devoted to providing more robust data collection methods and tools. This would allow for innovative and coordinated collection, analysis and reporting of evidence.
3. The M&E indicators should be sufficiently revised to capture changes in KAP on anti-corruption measures, and social norms in particular.
4. The capacity of project implementing partners should be further developed for their understanding of the M&E framework.
5. The VFM model, notwithstanding, ACORN should emphasise regular field visits to implementing states and partners. This would help to track and adjust project activities and plans for the purpose of generating appropriate results.
6. A learning platform should be established to serve as a coordination point of ACORN's M&E. This will ensure proper coordination, thereby erasing the perception that there is no coordination amongst ACORN partners.
7. DFID should encourage more collaboration between partners' projects in the states where they have presence. Such collaboration would explore opportunities for common activities in a way that delivers the ACORN outcomes.
8. The M&E consultant, Itad should encourage partners to commence the proposed learning sessions with each project partner, first on a quarterly basis, and second bi-annually and programme-wide. This will be a platform where everybody sits together to assess achievements and challenges.
9. Specific brands, such as MANTRA and SCRAP-C should be left in the hands of the implementing partners, post-ACORN programme. The lead implementers or partners should step up efforts at encouraging partners to take up some of these issues into their own programme. This should be done in association with the downstream partners.
10. ACORN's M&E should be re-tooled to include an effective communication plan. This will help to ensure the application of ACORN's M&E to social norms. Also, this will factor into (1) meetings within the project, and (2) bi-annual meeting programme-wide. In this case, lessons, achievements, challenges (including how to address them) can be discussed exhaustively.




Proposals for future M&E activities

To what extent does ActionAid Nigeria's M&E for SCRAP-C affect social norms?

Are the drivers of social norms of corruption in Nigeria peculiar to Nigeria?

Does the monitoring of cash transfers by ANEEJ encourage beneficiaries to report corruption?




What are the social drivers of the economy of corruption in Nigeria?

How is SERAP's action supporting youth mobilisation for anti-corruption?

Does YAF's project enable the movement from institutions to processes?





Part I

From Theory to Praxis:

Catalysing Change in the Social Norms of Corruption

1. Introduction

For an upward of two decades, the fight against corruption commonly called ‘anti-corruption’ has occupied a substantial portion of debates in development circles. This is currently being sustained via Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which is to “substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms” (see Target 16.5). The global anti-corruption agenda is majorly influenced by the recognition of the devastating impact of misappropriation of public funds on human well-being. In particular, Nigeria has an uncanny reputation for some of the worst scores on corruption and governance (Roy 2017). This, again, resonated in the 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International (TI), in which the country’s ranking dropped further (from 144 in 2018, to 146 in 2019 out of 180 countries). The country scored 26 out of 100 points, dropping from the 27 points that it maintained in preceding two years (2017 and 2018). This score is below the global average of 43. The report classified sub-Saharan Africa region as the lowest-performing region, and Nigeria ranked the fourth most corrupt country out of 19 countries in the West African region. More fundamentally, poor governance is also evidenced in selective adherence to the rule of law, which partly accounted for Nigeria’s poor ranking (*Channels Television* 2020).



Despite the several frontally attacks, however, the results of anti-corruption programming are ‘unsatisfactory’ in many ‘corruption afflicted’ countries. For example, the Nigerian state has committed substantial investments towards legal and institutional reforms to address corruption, but achievements have been limited. Perhaps the unsatisfactory results are due to the pursuit of Goal 16 of the SDGs with remarkably limited tools or set of tools that dominate interventions across contexts (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas 2016A). Anti-corruption in Nigeria is also being supported by the international community, such as the Anti-Corruption in Nigeria Programme (ACORN) implemented by United Kingdom (UK)’s Department for International Development (DFID). One of ACORN’s main outputs is ‘supportive society and social norms’. Incidentally, the social norms-based approach is fast gaining ground as a veritable tool of anti-corruption. This is in recognition of ‘locally prevailing conditions and context-specific drivers of corruption’ (Camargo 2017). A deeper approach in academic and policy circles is to understand the perception of corruption by citizens who are directly involved in corrupt acts and behaviours (Hoffmann and Patel 2017; Camargo 2017). In effect, there has been a shift towards identifying the social norms that fuel and perpetuate corruption for the purpose of interventions. For practitioners, social norms are increasingly becoming central to achieving sustainability in behaviour change in corruption, and other abuses, such as criminal activity, violence and state capture (Chigas and Scharbatke-Church 2019A).

Further to the above, the non-governmental organisation (NGO), Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice (ANEEJ), with support by the UK’s DFID commissioned the project, ‘Applying Social Norms in Anti-corruption Programming’. The project was implemented under the ‘supportive society and social norms’ component of ACORN. The purpose of the project was to examine the effectiveness of the social norms-based approaches to anti-corruption as applied by the principal partners under ACORN. The specific objectives of the project were to: (1) establish a comprehensive research underpinning for the application of a social norms approach in anti-corruption programming and reforms generally; (2) clarify, justify and determine the specific policy and contextual assumptions underpinning the social norms approaches adopted in each project under ACORN; (3) identify and evaluate the risks involved in the application of a social norms approach in anti-corruption programming generally and in the specific context of ACORN and recommend appropriate action; and (4) examine and determine the appropriateness of the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework of the ACORN programme for capturing the social norms components of its projects and activities – including baselines, statement of outcomes, measuring impact and documenting lessons learned - and make necessary recommendations.

ANEEJ retained the services of a consultant (Dr. Oscar E. Ubhenin) to provide support services towards the project analysis and implementation over a seven-month duration (September 2019- March 2020). Overall, the methodology of the project entailed a combination of desk research and interviews. The desk research helped to draw on current literature, while the interviews with DFID’s Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) and ACORN principal partners provided insights into the subject matter, where necessary. The technical team of ANEEJ was also helpful in refining and narrowing the study scope for appropriateness (see the draft work plan, please). In particular, the consultant adopted a comprehensive literature search, review and analysis to implement of objective 1. The results are contained in Progress Report 1 ‘From theory to praxis: Catalysing change in the social norms of corruption’ (ANEEJ 2019B). Points of relevance were extracted for the implementation of the objectives 2 to 4.

Towards achieving 'value for money' (VFM), the methodology adopted in implementing objectives 2 and 3 (scoping study) coincided with that of objective 4 (review of ACORN's monitoring and evaluation). Thus a work plan was designed to cover field visits to DFID Nigeria and ACORN principal partners (in Abuja, Benin City and Lagos). In sum, two additional reports were submitted, namely: 'Scoping study on application of social norms approach in the ACORN programme' (ANEEJ 2020A) and 'Review of ACORN's monitoring and evaluation framework for social norms' (ANEEJ 2020B). This final report is in four main parts. Part 1 is entitled 'From Theory to Praxis: Catalysing Change in the Social Norms of Corruption'. Part 2 is entitled 'DFID's ACORN and Its Social Norms Interventions'. Part 3 reviews 'ACORN's Monitoring and Evaluation Framework'. Part 4 concludes the report.

2. The Lens



Two identifiable theoretical models in anti-corruption programming are the 'principal-agent' and the 'collective action' (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas 2016A; Scharbatke-Church and Barnard-Webster 2017). The 'principal' delegates tasks and guarantees compliance with regulations to an 'agent'. However, agent's interests may differ from the principal's interests, and the agent may choose to hide strategic information from the principal. Thus, corruption arises when agents are opportune to use 'asymmetric' information, and pursue their private interests at the expense of the principal's interests, and perhaps, the 'public good'. This is the hallmark of the 'principal-agent' theory, which mostly informs 'development assisted' programmes. A competing explanation of corruption occurrence hinges on its persistence and perception as a form of collective action, particularly in non-western societies. In this case, the principal is often not principled, and the benevolent principal who would control the agent in public service is lacking. Second, democratic elections, which ought to serve as a control mechanism, are also lacking in non-western states, due to material and financial gains. This is evidenced in food and money offered by the Democratic Party of Socialists in Montenegro (Mijović 2019), influence of voters by the elites or 'corrupt politicians' in Albani (Shehaj 2019), and outright 'vote buying', which is fast gaining a space in Nigeria's political lexicon (Ubhenin 2019). Third, corruption is the 'norm', and not an exception to a norm of integrity and equal treatment in particularistic societies.

The foregoing offers a lens for understanding anti-corruption analysis and programming, but it is also important to understand how the behaviour of a group would influence an individual's behaviour. This is symbolised by the writings of sociologists and social scientists on reference group (e.g. Sherif and Cantrill 1947; Merton and Kitt 1950; Hyman 1960; Nelson 1961; Saxena 1971). It was earlier understood as the specific group of people that influence how individuals "think, feel, and see things" (Saxena 1971; Institute of Reproductive Health 2017, 7). For some, social norms are permanently in relation to a given reference group of people that is of importance to the individual who would conform with the behaviour of interest. It is sometimes applied as social interaction or social group. A marked deviation from the traditional sociological perspective of policy analysis on social norms and corruption is the 'social normative pressures' developed by Jackson and Köbis (2018). In their opinion, people simultaneously belong to multiple social networks a framework that distinguishes between (a) sources of pressures that emanate from society, namely: sociability and kinship pressures, and (b) sources of pressures that stem from either the vertical dimension or horizontal dimension within organisations. 'Sociability' is defined by the statement, "I have to return the favour". In China, gifts are instruments to secure help or favour from persons who are well-positioned. In Tanzania, users of public health facilities often offer unsolicited bribes and gifts in order to create a relationship with the healthcare provider. Those who refuse to give or accept bribes and gifts suffer social costs, such as gossiping, bad-mouthing, criticism and social isolation.

Thus there is a norm of bribes and gifts in Tanzanian public health services. In Nigeria, this social norm is supported by statements, such as ‘softening the ground’; ‘scratch my back, I scratch your back’; and ‘you do for me, I do for you’. Thus a public officer may be compelled to do the bidding of somebody who has shown him or her favour’. ‘Sociability’ pressures have been successfully relieved and shifted through the worthless ‘zero-rupee’ notes created by the India-based NGO, Fifth Pillar in India, and engraved with the word, “I promise to neither accept nor give a bribe”. In Serbia, the pins stating, “I work for the salary, not the gift” have also been used by service providers as ‘coordinated signals”. Pressures from the ‘kinship’ stream push for the statement, “Family first”. This is easily supported by the findings of the policy experiment, which revealed that the 2010 salary raise for Ghana police officers could not mitigate petty corruption on highways. Rather, the police officers faced increased demands from kin who felt they had become wealthier after salary increase. With the salary increase, there was a concomitant raise in the police officers’ social status and shifted the reference point for an appropriate income. Arguably, therefore, the higher the salaries, the higher the expectations of public officers as ‘bribe takers’, and of citizens as ‘bribe givers’. Public officers may be afraid of the possible consequences of stopping bribe request (from their peers), and not sending money home (from their family). In real life, some persons would advance these as reasons for bribes and gifts.

The organisation based sources are either ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’ pressures. ‘Horizontal’ pressures would result in the statement, “My colleagues are doing it too”. For example, a local government staff in a primary health care centre may believe that his or her colleagues routinely accept a gift from a patient. Applied to the points of bribes and gifts on Nigerian highways, members of a parallel public safety organisation with a reputation for integrity in the past may have dropped from their moral ground because they perceive that officers and men of other public security organisation on the highway were ‘making money from motorists’. In effect, the collections by highway safety and security providers have become highly competitive. On the other hand, the vertical pressures are defined by the expressed statement, “I am forced from above”. In this case, bribery is a well-organised structure, and apparently there would be ‘no wahala’ (willingness to do shady deal for a fee). A thorough understanding of the social normative pressures that perpetuate corrupt practices in a given context would help practitioners in designing successful interventions to relieve the pressures in specific contexts. Yet, identifying social normative pressures requires combined methods, such as literature review, interviews, focus groups, vignettes, etc.

Attempts to bridge the gap in the ‘principal-agent’ theory as a tool of understanding corruption also led to the emergence of the ‘systems-thinking’ approach. This draws on the analysis of corruption in the criminal justice system (CJS) in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (2014-2017), Uganda (2015-2016), and the Central African Republic (CAR) (2016-2017) (Scharbatke-Church and Barnard-Webster 2017). A systems-based analysis entails breaking a process into its component parts. First is to identify the factors that generate the behavioural patterns, with each of the factors contributing towards sustaining the pattern. The factors include ‘drivers’, ‘enablers’, ‘effects’, and ‘mental models’. Applied to corruption analysis, ‘drivers’ are the factors that cause people to participate in corruption, and ‘enablers’ are the facilitators of the factors that make corruption possible, but not the reason for its occurrence. The outcomes of corrupt acts and behaviours are the ‘effects’. They show how citizens and members of the larger society are affected by a range of questionable or outright abusive actions. Finally, ‘mental models’ refer to ways of framing or thinking about issues, generally implicit, that often influence behaviours. Second, the systems-thinking approach organises identified factors into ‘a series of causal loops’ that would show how they interact with each other as a system (Scharbatke-Church and Barnard-Webster 2017). This component advances

the analysis beyond a simple list of factors, rather it creates a ‘map’ of how the factors relate to each other to produce consistent patterns of corrupt acts and behaviours. The resulting causal loop diagram or ‘systems map’ provides a visual tool that can be used in identifying ‘leverage points’, that is, aspects of the corrupt system that are susceptible to change. The systems map is also helpful in showing how aspects of corruption are embedded in larger social, political and economic processes. With the systems-thinking approach or systems-based analytic approach, practitioners can improve their understanding of the problem, identify atypical intervention points, test the plausibility of theories of change, as well as co-ordinate strategic planning, and flag redundancy (Scharbatke-Church and Barnard-Webster 2017). However, the systems thinking approach is more effective when implemented with other approaches.

The ‘flower model’ has also been adopted to present social norms as embedded in the social ecology. This was originally developed by Cislighi and Heise (2017) to illustrate the interaction of factors that drive behaviour. The identifiable domains are ‘individual’, ‘social’, ‘resources’ and ‘structural’. The ‘individual’ domain comprises age, sex, race and ethnicity, the developing body, knowledge, attitudes, values, beliefs, self-efficacy, skills, and aspirations. The ‘social’ domain consists of social and peer networks, family configuration, social capital and support, and positive deviants. The ‘resources’ domain include services, infrastructure and livelihood. The ‘structural’ domain consists of polices and laws, educational systems, governance structures, economic policy, and religious institutions. In a modified version, there are five categories, which interact to drive collective behaviour: ‘institutional’, ‘structural’, ‘material’, ‘social’, and ‘individual’. Power interacts within and between each of the five domains to form, enforce and transform social norms (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas 2019). More importantly, beneficiaries can be identified from the status quo ante bellum, and the retention of the prevailing norms.

3. The Literature



The pervasiveness of corrupt behaviours is such that “it is hidden yet widely acknowledged, harmful yet at times beneficial, where a victim today can be a perpetrator or beneficiary tomorrow” (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas 2016A, 6). What is, however, incontrovertible is that corruption is the use and abuse of public power, position, or office for personal advantage or gain (Androniceanu 2009A). Curiously, this conception of corruption agrees with the definition by TI “as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (undated). The literature further suggests that corruption is either ‘organised’ or ‘chaotic’ (Le Billon 2005), ‘materialistic’ or ‘non-materialistic’ (Nwabuzor 2003), ‘legal’ or ‘moral’ (Byrne, Arnold and Nagano 2010), ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘political’ (Osumah 2017), ‘petty’ or ‘grand’ (Osumah 2017), as well as ‘need-based’ or ‘greed-based’ (Chigas and Scharbatke-Church 2019).

In response to the size and scope of activities and behavioral tendencies, categorised as ‘corrupt’, state and non-state organisations have established mechanisms to identify its causes and proffer appropriate measures for its prevention. This is the hallmark of ‘anti-corruption’ but there is an institutional perspective of anti-corruption, namely: “the lower the probability of detection and punishment, the greater the risk that corruption will happen”. Also, “the lower the salaries, the rewards for performance, the security of employment, and professionalism in the public service, the greater the incentives for public officials to pursue self-serving rather than public-serving ends” (Androniceanu 2009B, 70). However, raising salaries as an approach to addressing ‘need-based’ corruption may not be effective in contexts, such as developing and fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS). This was discovered from the policy experiment on West Africa’s highways, wherein the Government of Ghana had doubled its police officers’ salaries in 2010, but the officers faced increased demands from kin who felt they had become



wealthier after salary increase (Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang 2015). In effect, the salary increase had raised the Ghana police officers' social status and shifted the reference point for an appropriate income (Chigas and Scharbatke-Church 2019). Arguably, therefore, higher salaries are raising the expectations of public officers as 'bribe takers' and citizens as 'bribe givers' (ANEEJ 2019B).

There are three identifiable challenges in anti-corruption (Chigas and Scharbatke-Church 2019A). First, anti-corruption campaigners are wont to frame corruption as a moral problem, that is, the result of 'greed' and moral depravity. However, corruption is not a moral problem. Second, there are different dynamics confronting different sectors, institutions and geographic regions. Hence, no one size would fit all in anti-corruption. Third, it is commonly believed that 'everybody is doing it', but behaviour change is a process, and not a demonstration.

There is a huge body of knowledge on 'socially-derived' rules and standards established to either guide or constrain human behaviour. This pertains to social norms, which have been variously defined as 'shared understandings' (Ostrom 2000), 'lever of social influence' (Goldstein and Cialdini 2007), 'unwritten rules of behaviour' (Jackson and Köbis 2018), and 'unspoken expectations' (Camargo 2019). Social norms are collectively shared beliefs about what others do (i.e. the typical) and what is expected of what others do within the group (i.e. the appropriate). This definition pertains to the forms of social norms, which in the main, are 'descriptive' and 'injunctive'. In other words, what is typical is descriptive, and what is appropriate is injunctive. In general, descriptive and injunctive norms communicated among groups influence behaviour (Lapinski, Kerr, Zhao and Shupp 2017). A most recent conception of social norms is either 'direct' (which permit a specific behaviour) or 'indirect' (which do not require a specific act) (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas 2019). In general, social norms are maintained by social approval and /or disapproval, and build upon existing assets in the community. This is through participation by members of the community, and by highlighting those who make healthy choices. The conformity of people to group expectation is informed by the human need for social approval or belonging. "If individuals depart from a norm, they frequently lose social approval and may be ostracised, gossiped about, or sanctioned in some other way" (Heise and Manji 2016, 2). Thus social norms provide a reference point for a beyond the formal rules explanation, regarding why people might agree to bribe-giving and bribe-taking.

However, there are conceptual blurs in social norms stemming from the confusion with culture, formal rules, morals and values. In 'clearing the blurs', social norms are differentiated from both personal attitudes and from actual behaviours as well as beliefs. Attitudes, according to Fishbein (1967), describe personal evaluation of a given behaviour. An attitude is an individual construct, an individually held belief regarding an evaluation, which suggests that something is either good or bad, exciting or boring, sacrilegious or virtuous, disgusting or charming, etc. Behaviours are what people actually do when confronted with that situation. For example, the civil servant or local government staff, or university lecturer accepts or rejects a gift from a citizen or a patient or a student, respectively. Beliefs pertain to the realities and the physical world that may or may not be true. In particular, beliefs are either 'social' or 'non-social'. Social beliefs are also called 'interdependent' beliefs, and are found in the realm of beliefs about others, and are a property of a group or a reference group. Thus they are mainly categorised as social norms. Civil servants may, observing that everyone else in their department is demanding a fee, and conclude that requiring money is typical or normal practice (i.e., a belief about what others do). On the other hand, civil servants may perceive, and reward, subtle (and not-so-subtle) messages from others in their department that they are expected to reap financial benefits from their position. Sometimes, this is reinforced by a similar expectation from their family. This is a belief about what others expect them to do, and it is either appropriate or expected. Non-social beliefs are the property of individuals.



The literature also distinguishes between ‘legal norms’, ‘moral norms’, and ‘social norms’ (Institute for Reproductive Health 2017). Accordingly, written rules (laws and regulations) make up the legal norms. These norms are enforced by formal organisms, such as the state, with the authority to prosecute non-compliers. Second, internally-driven, value-based motivators of behavior define moral norms. Moral norms push individuals to behave in compliance with ideal states for self and the world. There are connections between legal norms, moral norms and social norms. For example, legal and social norms could have both positive and negative influence over each other. Positive influence would result shift and realignment of one by the other. It is negative when one “crowds out” the other. Also, law enforcement can contribute to a shift in the norm. Yet, the laws not might be respected if they are too far from the norm. This again, is clear. “Law requires a social norm of legal obedience” (Institute of Reproductive Health 2017, 5). There is a stream of consensus in attempts to further clear the conceptual blurs in social norms. First, social norms are either written or unwritten. Second, social norms should not be confused with the behaviour generated by the rule. Third, social norms involve some degree of social sanctions for not complying. These are either external (such as being laughed at or dishonored by others), or internal (through guilt or anxiety). Fourth, the functionality of social norms stem from behaviours that are socially efficient (Scharbatke-Church and Hathaway 2017A).

The extant literature on the intersection of social norms and corruption also inspired empirical review. Therefore, we draw relevance from the conceptual landmark paper by the Corruption, Justice and Legitimacy (CJL) project, ‘Taking the blinders off: Questioning how development assistance is used to combat corruption’ (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas 2016A). This inspired three assignments in three contexts: DRC (in 2014), Northern Uganda (in 2016), and Bangui, CAR (in 2017). DRC’s project was ‘A systemic analysis of corruption in the criminal justice system (CJS) in Lubumbashi, DRC’ (Woodrow 2016). The research entailed a broad national level analysis and the establishment of a local network of people. The analysis of information provided by members of the local network was useful in generating a systems “map” of corruption for refinement and validation. With the systems map, practitioners are able to determine where and how to intervene to instigate positive changes. However, some challenges may arise in replicating the research elsewhere.

How does corruption function in the CJS in Northern Uganda and what is the impact on the legitimacy of these institutions? This was the main question formulated for the 2016 study of the police and criminal courts in Uganda (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas 2016B). The study utilised an extensive literature review on corruption and legitimacy, generally and in Northern Uganda, as well as field research. The research team of 2 internationals and 2 Ugandans applied a semi-structured interview protocol to interview 111 individuals in March and April 2016. Ninety of the interviews were conducted in Gulu and Lira districts and 21 in Kampala. Two focus groups were conducted (in Kampala and Gulu, respectively). A purposeful recruitment strategy was used in accessing individuals from different target groups, including: ordinary citizens, criminal justice sector actors (police and courts), actors related to the criminal justice sector (e.g. lawyers, civil society) and international donors. Interviewees were from rural and urban settings and included 57 men and 42 women. Twelve interviewees sex was not documented. The research uncovered interlocking sets of dynamics that influence each other and make corruption resistant to change: one set of dynamics that drive citizens to engage in or accede to corruption, and another (slightly different) set of dynamics driving police and judicial officers’ behaviour. The robustness of the methodology promises its applicability, but its utility must tailored to suit other sectors and contexts within Africa.



“Pity the man who is alone.” This is the main title of the report of study conducted in Bangui, CAR by de Coster, Scharbatke-Church, Barnard-Webster, with the support of Ekomo-Soignet, Woodrow, and Sende (2017). The purpose of the study was to contribute to more effective anti-corruption programming, with a focus on the police, courts and corrections in Bangui, in their role as criminal justice actors. 115 interviews and three focus groups were conducted with criminal justice actors, citizens and implementers or donors. Using purposive sampling, interviewees comprised 39 and 76 men with the majority self-identifying as Christian. One of the findings was that CJS in CAR was completely distorted by extortion/bribery, sexual favors, favoritism and political interference. In effect, justice is becoming unobtainable for an average citizen. Another major finding was corruption dynamic had been amplified by the Séléka/anti-Balaka conflict. From the study, a systems-based corruption analysis is unable to provide ‘a magic bullet’ for answers to all questions, or ‘a sure-fire solution’ to corrupt acts and behaviours. However, the framework provides “a nuanced understanding of the problem, in such a way that actors can see atypical ways of engaging, develop strategic partnerships and test the plausibility of theories of change” (Scharbatke-Church and Barnard-Webster 2017, 40). The study findings corroborate the utility of systems-based approach in anti-corruption programming, which is one of the frameworks espoused in this report.

Do higher salaries lower petty corruption? This question guided the policy experiment on West Africa’s highways (Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang 2015). The experiment was based on the 2010 salary raise for Ghana police officers, a strategy for mitigating petty corruption on its roads. The research participants were civil servants (Ghanaian policemen) who have received a treatment (higher salaries) and other civil servants (e.g., Ghanaian customs agents or Burkinabé policemen) who did not receive such a treatment. The research used unique data on bribes paid from over 2,100 truck trips in West Africa to observe the treated and control populations in multiple interactions (over 45,000 bribe “opportunities”) with truck drivers across 6 years: 4 years before the experiment (2006 - June 30, 2010) and two years afterwards (July 2010 - 2012). The experiment utilised a difference-in-difference and triple difference approach making use of the variation across civil service type, country and year to test the effects of raises in police salaries on bribes. Thus the researchers tested the treatment effect (salary increase) on the amount and levels of bribe taking at both individual stop and national levels, while controlling for truck, truck driver, road, time, and country characteristics. The researchers discovered that the Ghana police officers’ salary increase had significantly increased the police efforts to collect bribes, the value of bribes and the amounts given by truck drivers to policemen in total. This was opposed to decreasing petty corruption on Ghana roads. It is safe to argue that higher salaries are raising the expectations of public officers as ‘bribe takers’ and citizens as ‘bribe givers’. However, this finding may not apply to other contexts where higher salaries have sufficiently incentivised public officers to say ‘no to bribery and corruption’. In this case, the context also matters.

UK’s DFID, through its East Africa Research Fund, commissioned the Basel Institute on Governance to conduct the research project “Corruption, Social Norms and Behaviours in East Africa” towards shedding light into those “[behavioural] factors that influence the propensity for poor people to engage in, resist and report ‘corrupt transactions’” in three East African countries, namely, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The project was implemented in two phases (between January 2016 and August 2017). The study utilised semi-systematic literature review and a field work, including focus group discussion (FGD) and survey. It focused on the interactions between ordinary citizens and low-to-mid level officials in two sectors: health and education (in Tanzania and Uganda), and health and police (in Rwanda). The survey findings corroborated the East African Bribery Index, which reports high levels of corruption in Uganda (by 80% of respondents), medium levels of corruption in Tanzania (by 44% of respondents),





and low corruption in Rwanda (by 61% of respondents). From the findings, “the provision of public services in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda is indeed impacted – albeit in different ways - by behavioural patterns emanating from social norms and values, narrow frames and collectively held mental models” (Camargo 2017, 7). The robustness of this methodology can be tested through replication in other contexts.

Does partnering with a liar turn the honest dishonest? This was the major question guiding the study of how corrupt collaboration emerges and spreads in the contexts of freedom or lack of autonomy to choose one’s partners. The study entails the impact assessment that one’s dishonesty has on one’s partner’s dishonesty, called “the contagiousness of dishonesty” (Gross, Leib, Offerman, and Shalvi 2018, 1957). The researchers compared the partner-selection setting with two benchmark settings in which people cannot select a partner, namely: one in which people are forced to interact with the same partner, and another in which people are forced to change partners. This condition was further compared with two additional conditions: a forced-stay condition, in which participants had to stay with their partner throughout the experiment, and a forced-switch condition, in which participants were forced to repeatedly switch their partner. A total of 372 Participants were drawn from the subject pool of the Centre for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making at the University of Amsterdam. After numerous interactions, partners were either free to choose whether to stay with or switch their partner or forced to stay with or switch their partner. The results reveal that both dishonest and honest people exploit the freedom to choose a partner. Dishonest people seek a partner who will also lie—a “partner in crime.” Honest people, by contrast, engage in ethical free riding: They refrain from lying but also from leaving dishonest partners, taking advantage of their partners’ lies. From thy study, it would be insufficient to rely on people’s honesty for the purpose of curbing collaborative corruption. Rather, the essential is to encouraging honest individuals not to engage in ‘ethical free riding’. Yet, “people who are not willing to turn a blind eye and stand up to corruption should receive all praise” (Gross et al. 2018, 1967). This study will be helpful in understanding the influence of the reference group in social norms approach.

The point of departure for understanding social norms in corruption in Nigeria is the Chatham House Africa Programme study (Hoffmann and Patel 2017). The purpose of the study was to provide evidence for the application of behavioural insights in policymaking, as well as design and fine-tune policy interventions and messaging for collective practices, such as corruption. The researchers were interested in measuring the existence of social norms of corruption in Nigeria, and identifying the ‘driver’ of or ‘disincentive’ to certain corrupt behaviours. From the study, social norms of corruption in Nigeria are context- and sector-specific. In response, the study recommends changes to incentives in contexts where corruption is either a rational response or environmentally driven. Perhaps the survey would have been more robust with the inclusion of a systems-based approach to anti-corruption programming. However, the findings provide insights into the place of behaviours in anti-corruption in Nigeria.

Other related studies include a political economy analysis of the project ‘Strengthening Citizen’s Resistance against Prevalence of Corruption’ (SCRAP-C) and ‘formative research on knowledge, attitude and perception of corruption in three states of Nigeria’. SCRAP-C seeks “to influence and interrogate the social norms and attitudes that help corruption strives and sustained in Nigeria, with a view to effect social change” (CDD 2017). The research methods adopted entailed review of extant literature and fieldwork conducted in four Nigerian states: Borno, Enugu, Kaduna, and Lagos. The study covered the dynamics and patterns of corruption, social norms shaping corruption, and effects of corruption. In consideration of the sectors covered,

the study discovered “alarming and vicious circle of corruption in critical sectors like power, health, education and taxation.” The veritable channels for addressing certain social norms on which corruption thrives were found to be informal groups, such as artisans, youths, women, students, community-based organisations (CBOs), and faith-based organisations (FBOs).

The purpose of the formative research was to elicit information that would guide the design and implementation of Social and Behaviour Change interventions of the SCRAP-C project, towards changing the perception of corruption in Nigeria and thereby promoting attitude and practices that would mitigate corruption (CCP Nigeria 2018). It applied FGDs and in-depth interviews (IDIs) to elicit information from participants in three states in Nigeria: Akwa Ibom, Lagos and Kano. Thematic areas covered at both sessions (i.e. FGDs and IDIs) include perception on integrity, honesty and transparency; perception on corruption; impact of corruption on development; habits and preference of various media; views on corruption by civil society organisations (CSOs) and youths; and perception on groups that promotes positive values. The formative research discovered that participants understood the various forms corruption can take. Second, most participants could easily identify the devastating effects of corruption, particularly degraded infrastructure and poor socio-economic development. Third, high societal expectations from public officers within the family/community were found to be key sociocultural factors, values and practices that promote corruption. Other factors fueling corruption include godfatherism, lack of punishment for corrupt persons and uncertainty about the future. Fourth, values, such as honesty, integrity and transparency were identified by participants to be associated with support of anti-corruption practices. Therefore, designing an effective SBC intervention in the SCRAP-C project should consider messages which would focus on promoting moral and social values, and address societal factors (mainly the selfish high expectations from public office holders by families and community members).

4. The Social Norms Approach



In Berkowitz’s (2005) words, “social norms theory describes situations in which individuals, incorrectly perceive the attitudes, and/or behaviours of peers of other community members to be different from their own when, in fact, they are not” (193). In history, social norms theory, and subsequently approach, is best associated with reducing alcohol consumption and alcohol-related injury in (or among) college students. The social norms approach is simple to use, easily deployable, and utilises existing information. However, the social norms approach does use scare tactics or stigmatise unhealthy behaviour. The social norms approach would avoid the use of moralistic messages from authorities about how the target group ought to behave. Instead, the norm is to present the healthy norms already in existence among the group. People are strongly influenced by what others do, but may not always have accurate information about such behaviours. Thus, the applications of social norms are important means through which desirable behaviours can be encouraged among citizens (John et al 2019).

4.1 Assumptions of social norms approach

Social norms approach to behaviour change is an expression of a combination of lessons learned (or drawn) from the fields of (such as) social marketing, behavioural psychology, and evaluation research. **Table 1** below illustrates the assumptions of social norms theory by Berkowitz (2005).

Table 1: 'Assumptions of social norms theory'

1. Actions are often based on misinformation about misperception of others' attitudes and/or behaviour.
2. When misperceptions are defined or perceived as real, they have real consequences.
3. Individuals passively accept misperceptions rather than actively intervene to change them, hiding from others their true perceptions, feelings or beliefs.
4. The effects of misperceptions are self-perpetuating because they discourage the expression of opinions and actions that are falsely believed to be misinforming, while encouraging problem behaviours that are falsely believed to be normative.
5. Appropriate information about the actual norm will encourage individuals to express those beliefs that are consistent with the true, healthier norm, and inhibit problem behaviour that are inconsistent with it.
-
6. Individuals who do not personally engage in the problematic behaviour may contribute to the problem by the way in which they talk about the behaviour. Misperceptions thus function to strengthen beliefs and values that the "carriers of the misperception" do not themselves hold and contribute to the climate that encourages problem behaviour.
7. For a norm to be perpetuated it is not necessary for the majority to believe it, but only for the majority to believe that the majority believes it.

Source: Berkowitz (2005), 196.

These assumptions can be stated differently. First, misperceptions of how peers think and act would influence human behaviour. Therefore, overestimations of problem behaviour in peers will result in increase in problem behaviours, and underestimating problem behaviour in peers will discourage people from engaging in the problematic behaviour. Second, either a decrease in the problem behavior or an increase in the desired behavior would occur when misperceptions of perceived norms are corrected. Third, our perceptions of our peers' attitudes and behaviours have a tremendous influence on our attitudes and behaviours. In application, those who tend to support corrupt behaviours are being influenced their peers and behaviours towards corruption. Fourth, our perceptions are often inaccurate. This is because we tend to over-estimate the number of our peers who value and make unhealthy choices and under-estimate the number who value and make healthy choices. In application to anti-corruption, we are tempted to think that many of our peers would prefer corrupt behaviour, while those who would say 'no to corruption' are fewer. In real terms, however, we would be amazed at the 'islands of excellence' (Therkildsen 2008).

Fifth, if in a given group or population of people, most people are making healthy choices but most people believe that their peers are making unhealthy choices, then a social norms campaign may help to reduce the misperception and further encourage healthy choices. This underscores the image re-branding campaigns by governments and NGOs. Quick examples

are Nigeria’s War against Indiscipline campaign by the Buhari/Idiagbon regime (1983-1985), ‘Not in Our Character’ campaign by General Sani Abacha (1984-1998), ‘Nigeria: Good People, Great Nation’ campaign by President Umaru Musa Y’Adua, and ‘Change Begins with Me’ by President Muhammadu. The Nigeria-based NGO, ANEEJ also developed the ‘corruption must not pay campaign’ under the ‘Monitoring of Recovered Assets in Nigeria through Transparency and Accountability’ (MANTRA).

Sixth, it is easy for people to conform to different social norms pending their discovery of the dominant in a particular moment. On the other hand, “nonconformity with the social norm could result in an external sanction e.g. disapproval of contemporaries or an internal sanction e.g. shame” (Scharbatke-Church and Hathaway 2017A). Second, social norms approach hinges on the misperception that is the gap between perceived norms (what we view as typical or standard in a group) and actual norms (the real beliefs and actions of the group). Perceived norms affect peer influences more than actual norms.

4.2 Limitations of social norms theory in campaigns

The social norms theory has been found to be particularly useful in campaigns, but there are limitations. First, misperceptions by participants of an intervention may lead to questioning the initial message being presented to them. In response, information must be presented in a reliable way to correct those misperceptions. Second, when data are poorly collected in the initial stage, there can be unreliable data, and poor choice of normative message. This will potentially undermine the campaign and reinforce misperceptions. To address this limitation, would work need substantial investment on research and data collection would help to understand the norms that exist in the group of interest. Also, accuracy can be achieved by ensuring that data collection instrument is strong. Third, unreliable sources, and sources that are not credible to the target population, can result in messages that are not appealing. This will undermine the campaign, even if the message is correctly chosen. Addressing this limitation would require restriction to credible and reliable sources of information. Fourth, the dose, or amount of the message may be insufficient or too much for the target population. This will have negative impact on the interventions, and the message may become a ‘commonplace’. Addressing this limitation will require balanced message, that is neither insufficient nor too much for a ‘commonplace’. Perhaps social norms interventions would be effective when presented in interactive formats. See table 2 below on the limitations of social norms campaigns and their solutions.

Table 2: ‘Limitations of social norms campaigns and solutions’

Limitation(s)	Outcome(s)	Solution(s)
Participants’ misperceptions	Doubt of initial message	Present correct information Adhere to research ethics
Poor data collection	Weak messaging and campaign	Substantial investment Strong data collection tool
Lack of credible sources of data	Unappealing message and campaign	Credible and reliable data Substantial investment
Inaccurate message	‘Commonplace’ interventions	Balance messaging Interactive presentation

Source: Boston University School of Public Health (No Date)



4.4 Challenges of applying social norms in anti-corruption

Most recently, social norms interventions are being deployed to anti-corruption. Through social norms, the seemingly negative behaviors, such as corruption, are sustained over time. Also, social norms can be helpful in explaining the ineffective nature of the many anti-corruption programmes that do not address the factors behind normalised behaviors, such as paying bribes, nepotism (ANEJ 2019B). The literature provides a basis for studying the successful applications of social norms in anti-corruption. For example, the Chinese case serves to remind of the need to address a social norm, such as gift-giving and gift-receiving. Ghana's policy experiment shows that the higher the salaries earned by public officers, the higher their expectations as 'bribe takers', and from 'bribe givers'. In Paraguay, the "Ibáñez Collection" of men's pocket-less suits was widely publicised, and this inspired a public rejection of visible and widespread corrupt norms. In Rwanda, the pre-colonial style training camps called *itoreros* played key roles in strengthening anti-corruption norms. In Tanzania, failure to accept a gift or to reciprocate a favour is punished by means of gossip, criticism, and even social isolation. This pertains to social pressures and social networks. In Uganda, it is envisaged that recognition could powerfully motivate behaviour, provide instrumental value, and change citizens' expectations of their leaders. In effect, recognition is inexpensive compared to other complex mechanisms for changing social norms.

In summary, there are two categories of resources on social norms and anti-corruption. The first set of materials endorses the predominant principal-agent perspective and locates social norms in that framework. Second, the critical materials look at cultural, social, and power-based aspects of corruption, but does not employ a rigorous definition of social norms or theory about how they change (Scharbatke-Church and Hathaway 2017B). Despite the place of social norms approach in anti-corruption programming, there are however challenges as distilled from available evidence (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas 2019B).

First, people tend to ignore the law if it deviates largely from the social or moral norm. This is particularly the case of a law, which criminalises a sound norm-driven behaviour or a practice that is considered to be morally right. In response, government must align legal, sound and moral norms as evidenced in moderate law that is closer to the social norm. In essence, moderate laws are more likely to be obeyed by citizens (or enforced without great resistance). This can be a catalyst for a process that will eventually allow for more stringent laws as social norm change. Second, the state of the literature does not lend itself to practice. The social norms literature is 'highly academic', 'confounding', 'contradictory', and 'anathema to practitioners', and thus hard for non-academics to understand. This status is partly influenced by the divergent theoretical groups and interpretations of what constitutes social norms. In most cases, the social norms literature addresses contexts that are far from corruption, such as gender, health and sanitation, drinking in university, and the environment. In the words of Scharbatke-Church and Chigas (2019), "it is not obvious how these insights even apply to anti-corruption efforts" (4).

Third, large scale surveys are generally not feasible for the average anti-corruption agency. This helps to explain the difficulty in finding a methodology to identify social norms as either contributors or obstacles to corrupt behaviour or anti-corruption efforts. Yet, practitioners are being hindered by limited budgets, short timeliness, and existing in-house competencies. Fourth, existing tools do not position social norms in relation to other factors. It suffices to

mention that social norms cannot be understood in isolation, but in relation to other factors. Social norms provide a reason or motivation to engage in (or at least not refrain from) the behaviour. There are other drivers behind corrupt behaviour, apart from social norms. Social norms provide a reason or motivation to engage in (or at least not refrain from) the behaviour, but there are other determinants of people's behaviour apart from social norms. Social norms are especially powerful because they are grounded in people's desire to belong, they are backed up by social pressures or punishment from people whose approval or disapproval matter to the individual making the choice. Therefore, clarifying these relationships will be helpful in determining the best approach for catalysing change through integrity promotion or anti-corruption programming. Fifth, corruption dynamics have been found to greatly differ from country to country across all sectors. Addressing this challenge will require a thorough understanding of the context in which social norms are being applied to anti-corruption.

5. Selected Cases on Social Norms Application in Anti-Corruption

Social norms are found to be of a significant influence on people's behavior in stable contexts of the north. However, in most southern countries described as developing and "fragile" and conflict-affected states, the contexts are defined by societies, which are fragmented, or destabilised by violent conflicts. In these countries, identity groups are divided, hostile and distrustful. Also, power and politics are highly contested, often violently, in these countries (Chigas and Scharbatke-Church 2019B). This section draws extensively on the review of Panth's (2011) "Changing norms is key to fighting everyday corruption", a research paper based on contributions by individuals and organisations. The cases present real-life examples of citizens who are united in speaking up against corruption and social norms vis-à-vis corruption or to change public services affected by corrupt practices. It sheds light on successful practical approaches, tools, and techniques in organising citizens to stand against corruption. The established norms cover the use of idioms, such as Indonesians' KKN - korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme (corruption, collusion, and nepotism), Indians' riswat (bribery of public officials), Georgians' chackobili (corrupt), and Egyptians' 'facilitation fees'. Others are Tunisia's familiar proverb, 'a rotten fish starts at the head', as well as Filipinos' acceptance of corruption as kalakaran (a way of life), and each situational definition, such as pang-almusal (for breakfast), pang-tanghalian (for lunch), pang-merienda (for snacks), pang-hapunan (for dinner), para sa birthday ni hepe (for the chief's birthday), and Ninoy (the 500-peso bill, which features the face of former Senator Ninoy Aquino), and porsyento (percent).

Panth (2011) comprises 16 representative instances (cases) from different countries in the world, but India had two representative cases, which were found relevant to this study. Three of the cases were excluded from this review for different reasons. First, the impact assessment for the Columbia's case on 'culture of lawfulness' had not been conducted. Second, the cases on Indonesia and Bangladesh contained a lot of unwieldy materials, which tended to weaken the standard of the paper. In consideration of this, therefore, this review was restricted to 13 of the case studies as follows: Egypt, Georgia, Tunisia, Philippines, Uganda, Guatemala, Turkey, India (two cases), Hong Kong, Argentina, Brazil, and United Kingdom. The summary of review of Panth's (2011) cases of changes norms for anti-corruption is presented in appendix 1. Apart from the 16 cases presented by Panth (2011), this report also excavates additional cases from China. Ghana. Paraguav. Rwanda. Tanzania and Uganda.



5.1 China:

‘Watch your behaviour’



This case draws extensively on the Yung Wu’s (2019) blog post,

“Holidays bring warning messages: a Chinese approach to stopping graft.”

Each year, all citizens of China have the opportunity of enjoying seven public holidays:

New Year, Spring Festival (Chinese New Year), Qingming Festival (Tomb Sweeping), Labour Day (May Day), Dragon Boat Festival, Mid-Autumn Festival, and National Day. These public holidays enjoyed by all citizens of China present opportunities for the people to give and receive gifts. In essence, gift-giving on festivals is a cultural tradition that provides a space to show one’s decency in China. Gifts are also instruments to secure help or favour from ‘a well-positioned person’ (Wu 2019). Thus, gift-giving and acceptance are particularly rampant during the holidays. On its part, the Communist Party of China has an eight-point frugality code, which forbids any act of gift-giving, including mooncakes, mooncake vouchers, gift cards, and banquet. China has also established an anti-graft department called ‘Central Discipline Inspection Commission’ (CDIC). As part of anti-corruption campaign which started after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in Beijing in November 2012, the CDIC works to prevent (or protect) public officials from violating the Party’s eight-point code through education, such as sending warning messages to public officials. It is believed that warnings are effective as a precautionary approach to curbing luxurious life-style and excess bureaucracy by public officials. With warning messages, public officials are persistently reminded “about being self-cautions and consciously keeping away from any graft acts” (Wu 2019).

There are four components of the warning messages. First, the warning messages focus on high-incidence seasons for corrupt acts and behaviours. For example, the warning messages for towards the 70th Anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China reached an unprecedented height during preparation for the holiday. Second, the messages list all corruption scenarios that might occur during holidays, and forbid all. This is extended to all forms of gift-giving, such as ‘giving mooncakes’ or playing ‘Mahjong’. This procedure serves to set the boundary between a friendly gesture of cultural tradition and real gifts or corrupt exchange. The purpose of corruption listing, therefore, is to forestall any form of ambiguity. The third component of the warning messages entails explanation of how misconduct will be investigated and what the punishment will be. The general public is encouraged to report any incidence about public officials’ act in excessive bureaucracy, hedonism or extravagance during holidays. A hotline is established and anonymous as well as real-name tip-off letters are accepted by the CDIC. Reported cases of alleged corruption are immediately investigated and exposed to serve as ‘warnings’ to others. The message is clear: “Watch your behaviour! The masses are watching you” (cited in Wu 2019). In sum, this approach is whistleblowing, which will at least make others hesitate a bit when they see these words. Fourth, the social media and social networks are invaluable because public officials who do not reply to phone calls or emails on holidays, would definitely check their social media accounts, such as Wechat (Chinese version of WhatsApp) or other apps. By implication, “there is no place to hide even on holiday” (Wu 2019).

The CDIC’s annual report data show that 92,215 officials were investigated for violating the eight-point frugality code in 2018. This marks a 27.5% increase on 2017 investigated cases. In the first half of year 2019, 37,207 officials involved in 26,341 cases were placed under investigation. The effectiveness of these investigations should show in restraining the culturally rooted corrupt behaviours, in this case, gift-giving and receiving. However, such evidence does not exist. Yet, the Chinese case serves to remind of the need to address a social norm, such as gift-giving and gift-receiving.



5.2 Ghana: ‘Higher salaries, lower corruption?’

The literature supports the claim that countries with higher salaries generally have lower levels of corruption (van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001; Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013; Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang 2015). Thus financial or monetary incentives have influence on norms, and in fact, can disrupt normative while facilitating cooperative behaviour. Group identification is an enhancer or enabler of the effects of perceived descriptive norms on contribution behaviour. “The results of a public goods experiment indicate that the presence of a financial incentive for behavior can reduce the impact of perceived descriptive norms on behavior, and this reduction continues once the incentive is removed” (Lapinski et al 2017, 148). In consideration of this, the Government of Ghana sought to reform its public service, through the Ghana Universal Salary Structure (GUSS), and later the Single Spine Salary Structure (SSSS). The post-independence GUSS could not be implemented in the context of ongoing political unrest and instability. The SSSS or ‘single spine’ designed by the Gyampoh Commission was inspired by the biological analogy, namely: “all nerves and organs of the human body are connected to a single spinal cord” (Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang 2015, 6). By implication, all public service workers in Ghana, irrespective of sector and specialisation would be connected to a common salary system.

The Fair Wages and Salaries Commission (FWSC) was subsequently established by an Act of Parliament to administer the SSSS in 25 levels, with implementation in 2010. The Police was the first to receive the SSSS, through migration to the single spine structure by FWSC. However, this was a disproportionate pay structure in Ghana civil service. For President John Mahama, with the salary concerns sufficiently addressed, petty corruption ought to be a thing of the past. Sadly, however, corruption has persisted in Ghana. However, a study of the policy experiment on West Africa’s highways shows that the salary increase for police officers in Ghana merely raised their social status and shifted the reference point for an appropriate income (Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang 2015; Chigas and Scharbatke-Church 2019B). Arguably, therefore, the higher the salaries earned by public officers, the higher their expectations as ‘bribe takers’, and from ‘bribe givers’.

5.3 Paraguay: ‘Suits without pockets’

The Paraguayan politician, José María Ibáñez had a reputation for abuse of state power. In general, the behaviours of Ibáñez and other corrupt politicians had made the citizens disenchanted. In response, the owner of a chain of tailor shops designed a suit without pockets dubbed ‘anti-corruption suits’. The “Ibáñez Collection” of men’s pocketless suits was widely publicised in the Paraguayan media and other outlets abroad. The publicity inspired a public rejection of corrupt norms, which was visible and widespread.

5.4 Rwanda: ‘Self-image’

Rwanda introduced pre-colonial style training camps called itorereros. The training entails several weeks of learning in Rwanda history, pre-colonial values, and national policies to recover traditional values and ‘Rwandan way’. Participants also received value-based trainings on commitment, creativity, dignity, entrepreneurship, heroism, integrity, leadership, living with others, patriotism, rights, and self-esteem. By implication, corruption became associated with lack of values and dignity, as well as a betrayal of the nation. The itorereros played key roles in strengthening the norms of anti-corruption.





5.5 Tanzania: ‘Social pressures, social networks’

Evidence in the literature suggests that bribery and gift-giving had become socially acceptable in the provision of health services in Tanzania. It points to a linkage between social norms of gift-giving and reciprocity, on one hand, and patterns of bribery in the Tanzanian health sector, on the other hand (Camargo, Sambaiga, Kamanyi, Stahl and Kassa 2017). Interactions of individuals across their social networks in Tanzania have repeatedly served to confirm these norms. “Failing to accept a gift or to reciprocate a favour is punished by means of gossip, criticism, and even social isolation, further enforcing the norms” (GI-ACE 2019). In response, the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence (GI-ACE) Research Programme has developed an anti-bribery intervention, “Addressing bribery in the Tanzanian health sector: A behavioural approach”, to work with health workers and trusted community-based social networks. The purpose is to deliver messages of attitudinal and behavioural change. The action research project hypothesises as follows: “that effective and sustainable change can be yielded by (a) explicitly recognizing the role of social pressures in perpetuating practices of petty corruption, and (b) harnessing the power of social networks to promote better understanding about the hidden costs of corruption” (GI-ACE 2019).

The method entails engagement of both providers and users of public health services for the intervention. For the case of users, it involves identifying the right seed nodes (opinion leaders) in a network to disseminate the intervention, thereafter assessing how particular ideas and attitudes spread through their existing social networks. Plans for capturing the effect of the intervention on attitudes and behaviours include an exit survey in selected public dispensaries in Dar es Salaam. The impact will further be assessed through a rigorous evaluation approach, such as a randomised controlled trial. It is envisaged that the evidence will yield critical insights for the development of context sensitive interventions that take into account, behavioural drivers of decision making, which can make corruption difficult to eradicate solely by means of conventional legal approaches.




5.6 Uganda: ‘Non-monetary recognition’

This project is one of the 14 intervention programmes by GI-ACE, inspired by ineffectiveness of existing anti-corruption strategies, such as risk management, reporting platforms, whistleblower protection, and high-level campaigns. First, the misuse of public funds is being prevented through risk management strategies. Second, citizens are able to report corrupt acts and behaviours, using dedicated platforms. Third, whistle-blower protection encourages oversight of corruption by officials and the public. Fourth, corrupt officials are the usual targets of high-level campaigns. It should be noted that the afore-mentioned anti-corruption strategies are rather ineffective. Yet, the strategies are implemented across diverse contexts. In consideration of the foregoing, the GI-ACE initiated a fundamentally different approach through official recognition of ‘properly managed funds’. This is close to what obtains in businesses, which offer ‘employee of the month awards’. However, this strategy is yet to take root in reinforcing expectations regarding the management of public funds. Hence, the project ‘Rewarding good governance through community recognition’. The project explores how civic expectations may be realigned to counteract corruption in western Uganda. It works from the theory that fostering collective pride in good governance and providing a positive recognition for local leaders who forego corruption will decrease corruption in a national park revenue-sharing programme in Bwindi National Park, Western Uganda. In particular, village committees responsible for administering revenue-sharing funds were trained on the steps that they should take to avoid corruption when managing projects. The steps are requesting multiple bids from contractors, evaluating the experience and competence of contractors, and tracking milestones required to approve payments to contractors. The project worked with Uganda Wildlife

Authority to promise non-monetary recognition for completing this work successfully. Village committees that reduce the risks of corruption by completing these tasks will be recognised by a permanent sign at the entrance to their village and radio announcements recognizing committee members. Part of the tourists' gate fees are set aside for community development. This is to ensure that local residents enjoy direct benefits from the park.

It is envisaged that recognition could powerfully motivate behaviour for psychological reasons. "Officials may feel good about acting in ways that are consistent with social expectations and their own values" (Buntaine 2019). Second, recognition could provide instrumental value to local officials who may need such to secure promotion or additional resources. Third, citizens' expectations of their leaders, and how they hold them accountable may change through recognition for integrity in public resource management. Thus, "recognising officials who complete their jobs with integrity might work as an approach to anti-corruption" (Buntaine 2019). More fundamentally, recognition is inexpensive compared to other complex mechanisms for changing social norms.



Part II

DFID's ACORN and Its Social Norms Interventions

1. Background to ACORN

Before the inception ACORN, the UK's DFID has been involved in anti-corruption using different approaches, such as 'Justice for All'. However, ACORN signposts the beginning of a standalone anti-corruption programme. ACORN was partly inspired by the report 'DFID's approach to anti-corruption and its impact on the poor' released by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) in October 2014. ICAI is an independent non-departmental public body responsible for scrutinising British Official development assistance. ICAI focuses on maximising the effectiveness of the UK aid budget for intended beneficiaries and on delivering 'value for money' for UK taxpayers. It carries out independent reviews of aid programmes and of issues affecting the delivery of UK aid. In its afore-mentioned report, ICAI recommended that "DFID should develop standalone anti-corruption country strategies and, in addition to its current activities, programming that explicitly tackles corruption", and extending "over a 10- to 15-year time horizon with short-, medium- and long-term goals for reducing corruption, particularly with respect to the poor" (ICAI 2014, 1). The second source of inspiration for the ACORN programme was the London Anti-corruption Summit held in May 2016. The purpose of the Summit convened by British Prime Minister David Cameron was to add a global voice to the fight against corruption, and "increase the vim and vigour to processes leading to the recovery and repatriation of proceeds derived from corruption" (ANEEJ 2018A, 42). Curiously, Nigeria's

President Muhammadu Buhari joined other sovereign states to make commitments to anti-corruption in several areas, such as beneficial ownership, stronger partnerships against illicit financial flows (IFFs), open contracting, whistleblowers protection, asset recovery, and open government. Third, the Chatham House report, 'Collective action on corruption in Nigeria: A social norms approach to connecting society and institutions' (Hoffmann and Patel 2017) also forms part of the foundation work for ACORN.

In summary, ACORN is part of the HMG Nigeria Anti-Corruption Strategy, and it shows the UK's government desire to do more for Nigeria in the area of anti-corruption. Through ACORN, the UK's DFID engages with the Nigerians government and people. ACORN broadly seeks to support Nigeria's effort at tackling corruption by reducing public tolerance and improving enforcement efforts. For the UK's DFID, ACORN is represented as three 'S', namely: 'sanctions', 'systems' and 'society' (Bello 2018). Sanctions and systems make up the first main output of the ACORN programme called 'stronger sanctions regime'. By sanctions, ACORN is focusing on strengthening the capacity of the agencies working on corruption (including the judiciary) to detect, investigate and prosecute cases of corruption. By systems, ACORN is also working to strengthen the systems. This entails programmatic work and regular diplomatic conversation (Bello 2018). This stream entails supporting Nigerian authorities (including anti-corruption agencies) to put in place effective legislation and public policies to combat corruption, and to ensure looters are effectively investigated, prosecuted and convicted. Recorded achievements on systems include the introduction of 'Treasury Single Account' and 'Bank Verification Number', as well as the Nigerian government's commitment to Open Government Partnership (OGP), the development and implementation of Action Plans I and II (Bello 2018).

Society is embedded in the second main output of the ACORN programme called 'supportive society and social norms'. By applying society, ACORN seeks to understand people's perceptions of corruption, ensure that people really say "no to corruption", and are increasingly demanding an end to corruption. The society allows ACORN to work with civil society groups and individuals, particularly youths. Based on research and evidence, ACORN is getting a sense that a critical mass of the people are saying they have had enough. The second stream is intended to support Nigerian civil society to maintain public support for anti-corruption and progressively change social norms that currently facilitate (or even encourage) corruption. Thus, the second stream complements the first stream, which are regular traditional approaches to anti-corruption, such as institutional strengthening and a stronger sanctions regime. The third stream of main outputs entails 'results, evidence, communications and programme coordination'. ACORN is a five-year programme, with commencement date set on February 2, 2017 and planned termination on December 21, 2021. ACORN will cost £20 million of UK's tax payers' money. Geographically, ACORN is a national programme, and it is expected to touch as many Nigerians as possible. ACORN is not directed at any particular tribe or faith.



1.1 ACORN Policy Framework

ACORN is majorly guided by three sets of policy documents. First, the Nigerian (national) documents emanated majorly from baseline studies conducted by ACORN partners in the first six months at inception.

They are (1) assessment of the performance of anti-corruption agencies, (2) European Union funded 'Corruption in Nigeria: Bribery: Public experience and response' by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (July 2017), (3) UNODC's 'Corruption in Nigeria: Patterns and trends. Second survey on corruption as experienced by population' (December 2019), funded by DFID, and (4) Chatham House report, 'Collective action on corruption in Nigeria: A social norms approach to connecting society and institutions' (Hoffmann and Patel 2017). ACORN is also guided by the Nigerian policy framework. Second, the UK (national) policy documents include: (1) anti-corruption strategy 2017-2022, (2) serious and organised crime strategy 2018, and (3) asset recovery action plan 2019. Third, the international document is United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (Resolution 58/4 of the General Assembly, 2003). In summary, the ACORN programme is guided by Nigerian (national), UK (national (Nigeria), and international documents.



1.2 Assumptions of ACORN

ACORN, particularly the social norms component hinges on the following assumptions. First, a shift in the behaviour of citizens is required to achieve a change in social norms. "Unless people change, there would be no result" (ANE EJ/ Social Norms Interview with ACORN SRO 2019). Second, ACORN is tied to election and democratic governance, and elections belong to all citizens. Third, the most

important component of ACORN is that of society. From the logical framework of ACORN, each output is weighted, and social norms components carries 55 percent. It can be said that the assumptions have been proven right since the implementation of ACORN. This is because accountability institutions are captured by the elite. The supply side serves the status quo. But the demand side needs to bring transformational change.

1.3 ACORN: Collective Action, Anticipated Outcomes and Methods



From the practical interview with the Senior Responsible Owner of ACORN, taking individual action is risky, but collective action requires people. Therefore, the social norms component of ACORN requires a collective action (ANE EJ/ Social Norms Interview with ACORN SRO 2019). It is anticipated in the ACORN's society component that anti-corruption approaches would become the norm. This requires bridging the gap between national interest and trust, and changing norms have to do with trust. However, no methods and tools were suggested by DFID due to lack of expertise in defining the social norms-based interventions. Regarding progress, it is the view of DFID that ACORN is still at the information stage about how corruption is impeding negatively on the lives of individuals. This entails groundwork on information gathering. Progress has been made in creating accountability hurdles, websites, social media, rally, and how to engage. However, "social norms change takes generation, and the fight against corruption is for everybody" (ANE EJ/ Social Norms Interview with ACORN SRO 2019).


1.4 Barriers and Risks of ACORN



One of the barriers to ACORN is lack of access to quality information in Nigeria. Second, there is also misinformation. DFID is interested in influencing behaviours and attitudes.

Third, programmes sometimes occur in isolation. Fourth is biased investigation. Fifth is weak public confidence, and this is apathy. Sixth, the baseline is extremely low. This is because people are not just seeing impact. In effect, there is bias and mistrust. In response to the aforementioned barriers, DFID is not engaging politically. Rather, DFID responds at the programmatic levels. Second, there is no lobbying because it will affect the diplomatic value of ACORN. Other responses to barriers include a very strong advocacy. And need for reputation at scrutiny.

The major risk in implementation of the society component of ACORN is that it goes against the flow, which is 'corruption pays'. Therefore, it may not work. In response, DFID does close monitoring of ACORN, in addition to establishing a robust monitoring and evaluation programme. This will help to measure the workability of the programme.



1.5 ACORN: Key Influencers and Partners

In consideration of the place of key influencers, the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) believes that citizens have the power to decide what behaviour they want to adopt. Ordinary citizens also see themselves as being able to achieve change. Also, the society is more important because of peoples; perception. The principal partners in the ACORN programme are ActionAid Nigeria, ANEEJ, SERAP, and YAF. Recently, Adams Smith International, National Crime Agency, and UNODC (2018). Furthermore, the principal partners engage second-tier partners in their projects. It is also possible for all the partners to take a common position on what needs to be changed, and the solution to the problems.

1.6 DFID'S Consideration for Social Norms



The first consideration expressed by the SRO was the possibility of moving the ACORN's society component from inaction to action, with a particular focus on youths. The second consideration was the possibility of gaining deeper understanding of the partners' engagements, such as: (1) how has ActionAid Nigeria worked with various groups? And how do their M&E component affect changes in social norms?, (2) how does ANEEJ's monitoring of the cash transfers make beneficiaries more interested in anti-corruption?, (3) how did YAF's programme enable the movement from institutions to processes?, and (4) how will SERAP's actions support youth mobilisation for anti-corruption? These questions lend credence to this scoping study, and addressing them will help in taking a common position on what the ACORN's society programme seeks to change. This will further enhance co-operation among the ACORN partners in the area of social norms. The ACORN project partners interviewed for the purpose of this assignment include: ActionAid Nigeria, ANEEJ, Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), and Youth Alive Foundation (YAF). A review of the partners and projects is summarised in appendix II.

ActionAid is a global movement of people that aims to achieve structural changes to eradicate injustices and poverty in the world. ActionAid works with the poor and excluded, promote values and commitment in civil society, institutions and governments. ActionAid Nigeria is a member of ActionAid global federation, and it maintains a strong relationship of interdependence and mutual accountability within the international federation while ensuring a strong balance between self-rule and shared-rule. The UK's DFID support to ActionAid Nigeria under the ACORN is captured in the project, 'Strengthening Citizens' Resistance against Prevalence of Corruption' (shortened and called as SCRAP-C).

ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C was informed by a number of issues around citizens' inputs to anti-corruption. First, most donor agencies were discovered to have focused more on the supply side, which was having more support compared to the demand side, and addressing the demand side requires work with the citizens. Second, the attitude of the citizens within the Nigerian society is a consideration. SCRAP-C seeks to address the attitude of citizens towards the issue of corruption in Nigeria. This hinges on the discovery of a social acceptance in the society, including all classes, traditional, religious, market women, and the like. Curiously, nobody any more wants to resist corrupt acts in the Nigerian society. "Rather people who are corrupt are celebrated, they are given chieftaincy titles, and they are given high seats in public places" (ANEJ/ Social Norms Interview with ActionAid Nigeria 2019). The purpose of SCRAP-C, therefore, is to influence and interrogate the social norms and attitudes that help corruption thrive in Nigeria with a view to effecting a social change. Towards influencing social norms and attitudes on corruption and building public demand for anti-corruption, SCRAP-C was designed to be well-targeted, adaptive and innovative.

The target population of SCRAP-C is broad-based, between 200,000 and 1 million Nigerians, whether those who perpetuate the acts of corruption or those who do not perpetuate but do one or two things to allow corruption to thrive. In implementation, however, SCRAP-C's categorisation of the target population or audience include: youth, traditional institutions, religious institutions, women's groups, public servants and politicians. The private sector component was not segmented at the conception of SCRAP-C. However, in consideration of the fact that a good number of corruption that has been perpetuated in the country actually happens with the connivance of the private sector, SCRAP-C was later re-designed to cover the private sector. In other words, there is an economy of corruption, which is yearning for investigation (ANEJ/ Social Norms Interview with ActionAid Nigeria 2019).

In terms of geography, SCRAP-C cuts across Nigeria's five six geo-political zones, but with more presence in the North-west. This is understandable. The three states chosen in the North-west (Jigawa, Kaduna and Kano) are more urban, and have much commercial activities. Lagos State was chosen in the South-west because of its commercial significance. Again, this is understandable. One cannot exclude corruption from commercial activities. Enugu State was chosen in the South-east, Akwa-Ibom State was chosen in the South-south, and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) was chosen in the North-central. The predominant in the South-east is Ibo. There are Ibibio and Efik in the South-south. Yoruba is largely spoken in the South-west, Hausa is predominant in the North-west, and English cuts across. ActionAid has also designed messaging in Yoruba, and Hausa. English was general. From the project implementation, there is a difference in the work with local messaging. ActionAid Nigeria is implementing SCRAP-C in association with 10 other CSOs. SCRAP-C is designed to run for five years (2017-2022).



2.1 SCRAP-C Policy Framework

SCRAP-C by ActionAid Nigeria is guided by a number of policy documents. The first set of documents are those emanating from the baseline studies conducted in 2017. First, ActionAid Nigeria conducted a political economy analysis of the project 'Strengthening Citizen's Resistance against Prevalence of Corruption' (SCRAP-C). Second, there was a 'formative research on knowledge, attitude and perception of corruption in three states of Nigeria'. These two documents drive the implementation of SCRAP-C. The second set of policy documents include ActionAid's internal policies, such as the Safeguard Policy, Financial Policy, and Human Resource Policy. Third, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS), approved by the Federal Executive Council (on July 5, 2017) is also considered, although it was relatively new at inception of SCRAP-C. The fourth set of policy documents are the UNCAC (Resolution 58/4 of the General Assembly, 2003), and Commitments at the London Anti-Corruption Summit (May 2016).

2.2 Assumptions of SCRAP-C



The design and implementation of SCRAP-C by ActionAid Nigeria hinges on the following assumptions. The first assumption of SCRAP-C is that people are docile, and are not active in contributing to address the issue of corruption. In response, citizens' capacity to resist corruption needs to be strengthened. This will help in contributing to the activities of the government (or supply side), thereby surmounting corruption in Nigeria. The second assumption draws on the findings of the Chatham House Report. These pertain to context- and sector-specifics of social norms of corruption, changes in environment and behaviour, misconceptions about collective action, locality of social contract, hidden nature of the true consequences of corruption, and exemplary behaviour (Hoffmann and Patel 2017). However, one would find out that there is an established pattern of 'social acceptance' in the society, and this is impeding the capacity of citizens to respond to corruption.

The third assumption is that there is also tendency or great potential of people to address the issue of corruption, but how to address it is a huge problem in the society. The fourth assumption is that there is a legal definition of corruption. Although everybody sees everything that is 'not good' as 'corruption', it not all perceived acts of 'corruption' that can be taken to the Court.

And so, the only thing that validates the act of corruption is the Act or the Law, as it were. The fifth assumption is that if citizens do not work within the context of the legality of corruption, they might just be making noise, and nothing will change. The sixth assumption is that everyone believes that everyone in Nigeria is corrupt, and this is very strong. It is curious to note that this does not with Nigerians alone. Even foreigners believe that 'all Nigerians are corrupt', and they have this doubt about how public policies are being executed in Nigeria.

It is important to mention that most of the assumptions of SCRAP-C have been proven right in relative terms. First, published reports on abandoned projects are moving contractors to go back to project sites. This was lacking in its entirety in time past. For example, ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C has a rather innovative 'Media Endowment Fund', which allows funds to journalist to conduct investigative report on abandoned projects in different sectors, based on the political economy analysis of SCRAP-C. The four sectors covered include 'health', 'education', 'power' and 'tax administration', but there have been more results in health and education sectors over the past two years, and contractors are going back to site. However, on the very strong assumption that, everyone believes that everyone in Nigeria is corrupt, we have not been able to erase that from the minds of the people. Despite attempts at some 'Integrity Award', people still believe there is corruption in such award. In response, SCRAP-C is a platform for informing citizens that there is one in a million that is not corrupt in Nigeria. Yet, they insist it 'it is not possible'. For external observers, correcting this perception would require that Nigerians begin to do things differently, even within the policy space.

2.3 SCRAP-C: Activities, Methods and Tools



SCRAP-C by ActionAid Nigeria entails four broad activities: 'media engagement', 'citizens' engagement', 'policy engagement', and 'private sector engagement'. There is a sense in saying that these activities are based on social norms approach to anti-corruption, but efforts are being made to ensure that the social accountability component is included. At inception, ActionAid Nigeria reviewed studies across Africa especially, those countries that have actually used social norms lens to address corruption. A readily available case was that of Rwanda, which is purely driven by government, albeit with three components: 'top-down intervention', 'social accountability intervention', and 'behavioural intervention'. The top-down intervention entails relationship with the policy makers. The social accountability intervention entails the demand side, such as reporting on abandoned projects. The behavioural intervention has to do with the kind of messages that is put to change people's perception and behaviour. In effect, driving a successful anti-corruption model requires a linkage between these components. Also, SCRAP-C by ActionAid Nigeria focuses on social norms as changes in behaviour, particularly the practice change. Within the civil society or development space, the focus is either policy change or practice change. Under practice change, the focus is on behavioural change that could happen within practice change (i.e. either within the society or within government). The challenge, therefore, is to address those behaviours that need to change so that corruption can also be addressed or contribute to the fight against corruption. One issue that stands out uniquely is reporting, and incidentally people do not report corrupt practices. In response, SCRAP-C is being implemented to convince citizens to report wherever and whenever they see the acts of corruption. From the practical interviews held with ActionAid Nigeria, this is currently yielding results (ANEJ/ Social Norms Interview with ActionAid Nigeria 2019).

In achieving the social norms-based interventions, SCRAP-C adopts two methods and tools. First and foremost, there is messaging or campaigns, such as campaign fliers contained in branded bags. Second, there is a component of social audit by citizens. Some call it 'score card', but ActionAid calls it 'social audit', where citizens stake, side-by-side, what should be done and what is done, and report back to policy makers. In terms of collective action, SCRAP-C focuses on three basic components of the society: citizens' space, public servant space, and the private sector. What kind of policy is being formulated? What is citizens' input to that policy? What is the private sector input to that policy? Policies do not belong to government, but they are actually designed and implemented by government to address a particular problem. And most times, the people who perpetuate that problem, they are in the other space. Within the citizens' space, ActionAid Nigeria also has clusters, such as women's group, youth group, and Persons with Disabilities (PWDs).



2.4 SCRAP-C: Anticipated Outcomes

The anticipated outcome(s) is that more Nigerians are beginning to resist corruption through reporting, regardless of one's relationship with the offender. In effect, there would be a social rejection of people involved in corruption in the society as opposed to the erstwhile resistance of state apparatus with a mandate to arrest and prosecute offenders. The progress made in implementation is located in the number of people who are coming out to report corruption, such as in the case of abandoned projects. More citizens are beginning to report the issues of corruption, and they want to join the anti-corruption campaign.


2.5 SCRAP-C: Barriers and Risks



There are two identifiable barriers to the effective implementation of SCRAP-C, namely: 'cognitive', and 'policy'. Cognitive barrier is particularly a problem in the northern part of Nigeria because of high level of illiteracy. As a result, people do not really think along that situation. A case in point is the arrest of somebody for stealing NGN30 billion, but a Mallam felt bad. However, when he was made to understand that the stolen money could provide cows that would form a chain of cows from Kaduna to Abuja, without any space, he screamed and could concluded that such offender deserves to be killed. By implication, messages that would resonate with the people and their kind of lives are needed. Another potential to addressing this barrier is the use of reference network. That is, identify where people aggregate, examine their common belief, and thereafter insert the anti-corruption campaign. Second, the policy barriers pertain to the faulty nature of the Nigerian laws. If criminals are getting loopholes from the same law to escape, then such laws should be reformed. And any legal reform should agree with the prevailing behaviour or character.

In terms of risks, anti-corruption work is a high risk work in Nigeria, because a lot of persons are affected. Even within the civil society space, a lot of people are also compromised. So, one of the risks is compromise of the foot soldiers. When compromised, the foot soldiers have the capability to disrupt anti-corruption work. In response, ActionAid Nigeria relies on its systems, and those working on SCRAP-C are continuously reminded of the risk in being compromised. Good enough, SCRAP-C is 'zero tolerance to corruption'. Second, there is risk in the legal framework, which does not contain a social norm perspective. Where this occurs, what happens in the supply side would be different from what is found in the demand side. In response, ActionAid is working with the resolve to continue to push for legal reform because laws are not cast on stones. A third risk is 'short-termism'. If after five years, the norm is gone, that would become a big risk. A social norms thing has to take longer years

(say 10 years) for it to realise result. Sometimes, this resonates as 'doing the bid of donors'. In response, ActionAid believes that involving partners in project design would help the donor agency see the realities and match them with the theories and assumptions. In other words, the inputs of the people who would implement the project must be readily available at the design stage.



2.6 SCRAP-C: Key Influencers

ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C is neck-deep working with the media. What this means is that the quality of our involvement is high. The social media influencer adopted for SCRAP-C is Frank Dunga, with millions of followers. Femi Durotoye has also been engaged as a social media influencer. Second, ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C has organised a 'moral institutions engagement'. This entails town hall meetings for traditional rulers and religious leaders from the six states where SCRAP-C has presence. This was first organised in each state, and then a forum was organised to bring all the traditional rulers and religious leaders together to discuss issues around corruption. SCRAP-C has also done one or two things with Lectures at the University of Abuja, to have a mix of the town and the academia to discuss issues of corruption, but ActionAid Nigeria is not unmindful of the controversial nature of the Academic Staff Union of Universities as a body. Curiously, Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) is already designing a curriculum to address these issues.

2.7 SCRAP-C and Other Projects



The meeting point for SCRAP-C and other ACORN components is the collective action. Whatever is being done in the social norms space must connect to the sanctions space. For instance, if the attitude of the people is changing gradually at the downstream or within the citizens' space, the law and the policies that guide the fight against corruption must also be strengthened. By implication, if the community rejects an offender because he has stolen, the expectation is that when the person reaches the legal space or the policy space, the law should be able to validate that social rejection. Otherwise, the lives of those who reject the offender at the community level would be at risk when the law proclaims freedom of the offender. ActionAid Nigeria has worked with ANEEJ, SERAP, and YAF. ActionAid Nigeria did the behavioural insights programme in collaboration with ANEEJ. ActionAid Nigeria has also helped in supporting SERAP in some of their works around surveys. ActionAid also worked with YAF, and Adams Smith International (ASI) just came on board. Towards enhancing cooperation among the ACORN partners' projects, ActionAid Nigeria suggests a review meeting of ACORN partners, perhaps twice a year, where they all come together and talk to themselves what they do, and the results that they are achieving, and how they connect. That has worked very well within the SCRAP-C space, where meetings are held quarterly. At the end of each quarter, knowledge and evidence are shared on individual projects.

2.8 ActionAid Nigeria's Consideration



ActionAid Nigeria is interested in knowing the difference between this study and what is contained in the Chatham House report. The response is to understand the foundation of the work by partners, and make recommendations to DFID.



ANE EJ's MANTRA

The Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice (shortened and called as ANEEJ) is a national NGO with a goal to amplify the voice of the weak, the less privileged, and the marginalised groups in the society, including women and youths, in order to increase their participation in the democratic decision-making process. In its 25 years of existence, ANEEJ has demonstrated effectiveness in pursuit of environmental and economic justice. ANEEJ envisions an 'Africa without Poverty'. The project, 'Monitoring of Recovered Assets in Nigeria through Transparency and Accountability' (MANTRA) is currently being implemented by ANEEJ with the support of the UK's DFID as part of ACORN. ANEEJ's MANTRA was informed first, by its work, and second, its vision 'Africa without Poverty'. ANEEJ has consistently dealt with the issues that aggravate (or tend to aggravate) poverty in Africa, in general, and Nigeria, in particular. Since the existence of ANEEJ, efforts have been made to locate its interventions within the space, using the lens of anti-corruption and governance work. Another source of inspiration for MANTRA is ANEEJ's work in the broad field of asset recovery, and this is also premised on the fact that corruption is a major issue. This is also located within the sustainable development goals (SDGs) (Goal 16).

The primary goal of MANTRA, therefore, is to ensure that stolen assets stashed in western banks are returned to Nigeria. More fundamentally, there have been debates that when returned, the recovered assets are not properly utilised. Thus, the project aims to strengthen citizens' capacity to 'keep an eye' on the money when it is returned, and ensure that it is used for the purpose that it is meant for. A good example is the returned Abacha Loot (\$322.5 million), where both two sovereign countries agree to use the money for cash transfers. And so, the MANTRA project seeks to ensure that the money actually gets to the beneficiaries from the upstream to the downstream. Another component of MANTRA is the policy work on institutional and legal framework. This is informed by the existing gaps in Nigeria's legal system. The MANTRA project is also aimed at gathering evidence to do advocacy around policy reform, to ensure that bills, such as Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) Bill, are passed into law.

The target population of MANTRA include: the 'poorest of the poor' who are the major beneficiaries of Abacha Loot (\$322.5 million) irrespective of faith, tribe, creed, colour and location, the Nigerian policy makers, and the international community (with global roles in Global Forum on Asset Recovery (GFAR) and the London Anti-Corruption Summit). ANEEJ's MANTRA is implemented across the six geo-political zones of Nigeria. As at December 2019, MANTRA had reached 19 states and the Federal Capital Territory. The predominant languages are Hausa (in the North), Yoruba (in the West), Efik (in Cross River), and Pidgin (in general).



3.2 MANTRA Policy Framework

ANEEJ's MANTRA is guided by a number of policy documents. At inception in 2018, ANEEJ commissioned a scoping study on utilisation and monitoring of recovered Abacha loot and broader developmental and governance outcomes and context of the MANTRA project (ANEEJ 2018).

This document sets the pace for the effective implementation of the project, in addition to the contract documents (including the proposal, the log-frame and the theory of change). In the process, ANEEJ has made its contribution to the overall outcome of ACORN and its objectives, and these flow from the business case for the ACORN programme (ANEEJ/ Social Norms Interviews with ANEEJ 2020). Other policy documents guiding the implementation of MANTRA include the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS), approved by the Federal Executive Council (on July 5, 2017) and UNCAC (Resolution 58/4 of the General Assembly, 2003). ANEEJ is deeply involved in the monitoring and evaluation of implementation of UNCAC in Nigeria. ANEEJ has also formulated several internal policies to guide the MANTRA project implementation.



3.3 Assumptions of MANTRA

The MANTRA project design and implementation by ANEEJ is based on a set of assumptions, and they are enumerated below. The first assumption is the fact that overtime, corruption has been a problem in the society. And everybody yearns for action to be taken (both at the global level and the national level). Part of the assumption is that there would be cooperation from Nigerians, government and the international community. The second assumption is that there would be sufficient resources to drive the anti-corruption work. The third assumption is

that the anti-corruption stance of the All Progressives Congress -led federal government will continue to provide an enabling environment for the MANTRA project. The fourth assumption is that the Nigerian government is interested in lifting 100 million people out of poverty in the next 10 years. When corruption is reduced, poverty will also reduce, and there is a nexus between reduced corruption and reduced poverty.

Largely, the assumptions have been proven right. Apart from the fact that the global political momentum to fight corruption appears to be going down, anti-corruption remains one of the cardinal objectives of the APC-led federal government. Yet, at the international level, the fight against corruption is evidenced in the soon to be repatriated Abacha III (\$308 million) from Jersey, Ibori loot (\$9.6 million) from UK, and Alamieyeseigha loot (\$900,000) from the United States of America, as well as the trial of former Petroleum Minister, Mrs. Diezani Alison-Madueke. Also, there is a space for CSOs to intervene in anti-corruption. This is demonstrable in continuous engagement of with government. MANTRA's engagement with is one of the key result areas of the project. That government is listening, and there is collaboration between ANEEJ and government on the project. For instance, government is providing information to enable the monitoring of cash disbursements to beneficiaries. The collaborative work also shows in the invitation extended to ANEEJ as part of the monitoring of Abacha III (\$308 million) in 2019.

3.4 MANTRA: Activities, Methods and Tools



The MANTRA activities include monitoring, advocacy, and training of CSOs and citizens (held in 19 states including the Federal Capital Territory), stakeholders' engagement/ meeting, policy dialogue, town hall meetings for religious leaders, dissemination events, and public lectures. At the national level, ANEEJ has secured the gazette on asset recovery released by Nigerian Federal Government. ANEEJ also moved strongly to ensure that the POCA bill was passed by the National Assembly. However, the POCA bill was not assented to by the Nigerian President because of some issues raised by the stakeholders



3.5 MANTRA: Anticipated Outcomes


ANEEJ anticipates that there should be some change in behaviour that would lead to stronger resistance to corruption amongst citizens and those in government. This is because social norms approach does not focus on petty corruption alone. Thus individual and collective action that would pose resistance to corruption. Some huge successes have been recorded in this regard. For the first time, through the end-to-end monitoring of returned Abacha II (\$322.5 million), MANTRA has ensured that the funds are not being re-looted. Second, the returned loot utilisation is also contributing to attaining the SDGs. Third, the stakeholders meeting held in Yenagoa made the Bayelsa State government to change decision on the use of Alamieyeseigha loot (\$900,000). This was initially meant for the building of judges' quarters, but with the stakeholders meeting, the Bayelsa Government has decided to apply the loot to health sector. Fourth, MANTRA has successfully influenced the passage of the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) Bill, the Mutual Legal Assistance, and the Official Gazette on Asset Recovery. Fourth, the Grievance Redress Mechanism is being strengthened, and beneficiaries of the National Cash Transfer Programme (NCTP) are blowing whistle on corrupt officials. Fifth, the ICPC is also intervening to monitor the NCTP, following citizens' action. Sixth, following citizens' actions, the secrecy surrounding the return of Ibori loot was removed, and the Delta State Government is currently awaiting the repatriation of the asset. Seventh, the governments of Delta and Edo States have joined the OGP. Curiously, some of the recorded results were unintended by MANTRA.

3.6 MANTRA: Barriers and Risks



There are barriers to MANTRA implementation. First, some of the policy reforms are not directly under ANEEJ's control, due to stakeholders' interest in such reforms. That is, some policies are not within the purview of our ANEEJ because of government bureaucracy. Second, there are some entrenched attitudes and norms found in citizens' apathy towards progress being made. In response, citizens are involved in monitoring the disbursement of Abacha II (\$322.5 million). Other solutions include training of citizens and CSOs, media coverage and periodic release of information to members of the public. Every anti-corruption work involves some elements of risks. For persons that you are campaigning that their loot be returned, and you would want to monitor the loot disbursement. There is also insecurity in the country, typified by insurgency in the North-east, bandits and activities of herdsmen. Also, those not directly involved in the monitoring tend to spread more of negative information about the exercise. In response, ANEEJ has developed a risk register. There is also a risk matrix for the MANTRA project. In some cases, work is suspended to avoid risks.

3.7 MANTRA: Key Influencers



ANEEJ's MANTRA involves key influencers in all its activities. ANEEJ involves the media (social and conventional), and in reporting to donors. Links are provided to media reports. ANEEJ also engage with traditional rulers, religious leaders and government officials at all levels.



3.8 MANTRA and Other Projects

ANEEJ's MANTRA has done some joint activities with ActionAid, and SERAP (on social norms). ANEEJ was the first to pilot the work with traditional rulers and religious leaders. ANEEJ has organised a policy dialogue (with ActionAid), ANEEJ @ 25 Anniversary, ActionAid Nigeria' Country Director was one of the panelists. ANEEJ also had an engagement with YAF and UNODC, and held quarterly meetings with others. ANEEJ envisages more work with UNODC in the area of data generation to inform our intervention in social investment programme. ANEEJ is also looking at working with ActionAid Nigeria to also address some of the challenges in the social investment programme. We are also looking at working with ActionAid Nigeria on the constituency projects.

3.9 ANEEJ's Consideration



To enhance cooperation among the ACORN partners, it is important to strengthen the mechanism for joint work. ANEEJ is interested in the timely completion of this project, as well as gaining insights of the thinking of other partners towards improving the social norms-based interventions.

4

SERAP's Nigeria Anti-Corruption

Social Norms Project



SERAP

Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) is a non-profit, nonpartisan, legal and advocacy organisation devoted to promoting transparency, accountability and respect for socio-economic rights in Nigeria. In 2014, SERAP received the Wole Soyinka Anti-Corruption Defender Award. SERAP is also a nominee of the UN Civil Society Award and Ford Foundation's Jubilee Transparency Award. It serves as one of the two sub-Saharan African civil society representatives on UNCAC Coalition's governing committee. SERAP is currently implementing the 'Nigeria Anti-Corruption Social Norms Project' under the ACORN programme. The project was informed by the limited results of anti-corruption by the Nigerian governmental institutions. Sec. Also, most Nigerians do not report corruption. Therefore, the primary goal of SERAP's 'Nigeria Anti-Corruption Social Norms Project' is to investigate why people behave the way they do concerning corruption, and to build a new way of looking at corruption. The 'Nigeria Anti-Corruption Social Norms Project' targets the entire Nigerian population, regardless of faith or tribe. In terms of coverage, the project is implemented in the six geo-political zones of Nigeria. Pidgin cuts across the six geo-political zones of the country.



4.1 SERAP Projects' Policy Framework

Implementation of SERAP's 'Nigeria Anti-Corruption Social Norms Project' is guided by a number of policy documents. The outcome of the first report 'Nigeria Anti-Corruption Performance Assessment Survey' led to the Nigerian Anti-Corruption Social Norms Project. The second 'Nigeria: Anti-Corruption Social Norms Report' is more investigative. Others are NACS and a concept paper developed for SERAP by a consultant, Mwangy Kiberty.

of Nigerians would not take steps against corruption, ranging from reporting corruption to supporting anti-corruption. From SERAP's (2019) study, 96.2 percent agreed that corruption is a problem. 56.7 percent say that Nigerians can do something to reduce corruption. 52 percent cannot see the role they can play to end corruption. However, based on SERAP's survey, Nigerians can actually take steps to reduce corruption.

4.3 SERAP Project's Activities, Methods and Tools



The activities of SERAP's social norms project are research, reporting, launching, and advocacy. Broadly, the social norms-based activities fall into two categories: 'educative' and 'reformative'. The reformative part is more important because the National Working Committee comprises those playing a role in

4.2 Assumptions of SERAP's Project

The design and implementation of SERAP's social norms project is based upon an assumption, that more Nigerians feel bad about corruption, but a larger percentage



influencing social norms. The methods and tools comprise education, media engagement (including social media), infographs of reports on social media platforms. Animation is also used for illustration. Other methods include the holding of workshops for University students and government institutions, especially National Orientation Agency (NOA). The project implementation also requires a collective action.



4.4 SERAP's Project: Anticipated Outcomes

SERAP anticipates that people will change their behaviour that encourages corruption over time. It is instructive to note that progress is being made in the project. SERAP intends to work with NOA in disseminating the report findings. This will also involve other stakeholders, such as community leaders and traditional rulers. The progress can be recorded from the design of the TOR for the consultants, through the field work and reporting, and SERAP is currently at the post launch advocacy of the report.




4.5 SERAP's Project: Barriers and Risks

One barrier to effective implementation of the project is late release of funds. Another barrier is lack of funds for the partner government institution, namely: NOA. Pointedly, DFID's mandate to SERAP does not cover the building of technical capacity for any organisation. In response, SERAP is racing against the clock, although nothing can be done for NOA. In terms of risk, there is insecurity in some parts of Northern Nigeria. Second, there is the issue of past experience and mere perception, which would form a basis for people to critique the project. In response to insecurity, SERAP gives identification tags to its field researchers. Second, SERAP uses convenience work in the hot-bed of

conflict in the North-east. Third, the consultant built in questions for the past experience and mere perception.

4.6 SERAP's Project: Key Influencers



In terms of involvement of key influencers by SERAP, the media ranks first, religious leaders rank second, traditional rulers rank third, and celebrities will come fourth.

4.7 SERAP's Project and Others



In terms of the entire ACORN components, SERAP ranks society as first, followed by system and then sanctions. Also, SERAP has worked with ANEEJ, ActionAid, ASI, and UNODC as members of the National Working Committee on SERAP's project 'Nigeria Anti-Corruption Social Norms Project'. From planning to reporting, these organisations are part of the project. They are also invited to other programmes organised by SERAP. Collaboration occurs mostly in research work and advocacy. However, no formal relationship exists in advocacy. Towards enhancing cooperation, SERAP recommends that programmatic activities should have a percentage for collaboration before approval by DFID.

4.8 SERAP's Consideration



SERAP seeks to know the purpose of this scoping study.



Y-PAC

Youth Alive Foundation (YAF) is a non-governmental organisation with a mission to redefine the role and contribution of the Nigerian youth in the country's governance and development processes. YAF seeks to provide a platform to harness and nurture youths through informed, innovative and value driven programmes for personal, community and national development. YAF was founded in 1999 and officially registered in 2002. YAF's project under the ACORN is entitled 'Strengthening Youth Participation against Corruption' (Y-PAC). Y-PAC was informed by the realisation that youths were conspicuously absent from the national conversation around corruption. YAF discovered this a culture was acceptable by the future leaders because they were born into the context of corruption. In response, YAF felt the need to inform the youths that it was unacceptable, and it can be changed with their involvement. Therefore, the primary goal of Y-PAC is to strengthen youth participation in fight against corruption by mobilising youth nationally through advocacy, capacity building and social marketing for behaviour change. "Y-PAC is a programme where the youths who forms a large quotient of the society will be trained, empowered and enhanced at all strata to achieve their enviable dreams" (Simeon 2019). The target population of Y-PAC in its pioneer phase of was 18 - 35 years across Nigeria, but this has been modified to cover secondary school age (up to 12 years) in different states of the federation. The areas covered by the Y-PAC are Akwa-Ibom, Cross Rivers, Kano, Lagos, Rivers, and Federal Capital Territory. The predominant languages in these states are English and Pidgin.




5.1 Y-PAC Policy Framework

YAF's Y-PAC is guided by a number of policy documents. At YAF conducted a Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) study about corruption in three states (including Federal Capital Territory) and 44 local government areas. In addition, YAF reviewed the NACS, and found it to be in line with what they were doing in the project. The Chatham House Report is another top consideration.



5.2 Assumptions of Y-PAC

First, the inherent assumption of the project is that people would be engaged in the fight against corruption if there is social marketing, people are mobilised and informed about corruption, and a platform is created for young people to reach and support. Second, youths are not being engaged because nobody is making extra effort towards mobilising and creating platform or space for engagement. For the record, these assumptions have been proven right.



5.3 Y-PAC: Activities, Methods and Tools

Y-PAC's activities include capacity building; project management, and research. For example, YAF has done capacity building programmes for staff of ICPC, and National Youth Service Corps. However, YAF is being skeptical about working with government because of perceived difficulty in working with government. It can be said that the activities of Y-PAC are based on collective action, involving students and youth groups. Particularly, for social norms, these activities do not target individuals, rather the focus is on social networks. An individual might be interested in doing the

thing, but the perception of what is accepted by all might push the individual to do otherwise. Therefore, efforts must be made to change the mentality of peoples' networks so that they would feel comfortable with a counter narrative. For example, in campaigning against 'sex for grade' and 'sex for admission' in the University, YAF targets social network groups and peer groups. In achieving the social norms-based interventions, Y-PAC adopts capacity building and technology major tools. Of course, citizens' inability to engage is due to lack of knowledge.

5.4 Y-PAC: Anticipated Outcomes




The anticipated outcome(s) is that more youths would begin to resist corruption through engagement. Of course, progress is being made in implementation. A quick testimony pertains to a woman who attended Y-PAC's programme. She was so passionate, and she started organising and training on advocacy skills, such as how to meet your lawmaker, and how to identify cases. And she did exceptionally well and she is one out of many successes of Y-PAC. Second, one of YAF's partners on Y-PAC project organised a programme on vote buying and vote selling (in Kano). After sensitisation on the implications of vote buying and vote selling for corruption, he went and destroyed all the Personal Voters Cards (PVCs) in his possession. In another sensitisation programme by another partner, a youth openly confessed to being the leader of people who buy and sell PVCs. He promised to work hard to ensure that all those involved in the act will stop vote buying and vote selling.

5.5 Y-PAC: Barriers and Risks



One major barrier to implementing Y-PAC is strong opposition from school authorities. In response, YAF rides on the back of students' association to pursue the goals of Y-PAC, including use of emails. On the risk side, working with democratic system is really difficult. Also, government agencies sometimes

pose huge risks. In response, YAF exercise patience because working with government agencies requires a lot of patience, and they want to achieve service delivery effectively.



5.6 Y-PAC: Key Influencers

Y-PAC by YAF uses key influencers a lot. Examples include Tuface, Simi, P-Square. YAF's engagement with religious leaders on a greater project scale was minimal, although it engaged in some locations like Abuja and Kano. YAF had an Imam who was spreading issues on corruption. YAF has also engaged traditional rulers in Akwa-Ibom, Abuja, and Kano, Lagos (Epe). For example, all the leaders in Epe community are on board.

5.7 Y-PAC and Other Projects

YAF's work has been complemented by the activities of SERAP.



5.8 YAF's Consideration

YAF's consideration is that the real achievements of ACORN partners should be captured.





Part III

ACORN's Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

1. The Framework

Central to this review is the concept, 'theory of change' (TOC), defined as "a complete, coherent, and correct causal model from funding to inputs and activities to outputs to outcomes and impacts" (Pritchett, Samji, and Hammer 2013). There are two fundamental 'why' questions in a TOC. First, why will the agents of the implementing organization translate funding into inputs and inputs into activities that will create useful outputs? Second, why will the outputs produced by the project/programme increase the well-being of the intended beneficiaries? Also, there are positive behavioural models of how people respond to the opportunities created by the project. The M&E plan of a project is one mechanism for providing explanations for the TOC. Pritchett et al (2013) define M&E as "routine, and nearly universal, components of externally funded development projects" (4).

In detail, monitoring refers to the regular collection of information to track implementation progress. Monitoring 'M' is an important part of reporting and accountability. Through 'M', data are generated, and such data are internal to the development project with a focus on process and progress compliance. 'M' serves the needs of both implementing agencies and funding agencies. First, 'M' is project management mechanism for implementing agencies, through data tracking, progress tracking, barriers identification, and project sustenance. Second, 'M' is an accountability mechanism for funding agencies by ensuring that all inputs are utilised as

agreed, and the process followed agreed upon rules. Plausible 'M' questions include the following: (1) Are inputs being used (e.g. is the project disbursing according to plans)? (2) Are inputs being used according to acceptable processes (e.g. are procurement rules being followed)? (3) Are the inputs used translating into the planned activities? (4) Are those activities producing the expected outputs? Basically, 'M' would ask: 'is the project doing things right?'

On the other hand, the question: 'is the project doing the right things?' belongs to Evaluation 'E'. This pertains to an effective utilisation of resources for its intended purposes. This is the ideal, but the practice tends to suggest three distinct terms: project valuation, implementation evaluation and impact evaluation. Project valuation was first applied as a tool for ex ante analysis of development projects to determine which projects should be funded from a rather limited budget. However, the valuation of project outcomes into cost-benefit calculus was identified as a main intellectual problem. Second, implementation evaluation is ex post evaluation, and it is to certify the implementation of the project as designed. Third, impact evaluation is an ex post measurement of both internally generated data and outcomes which are external to the project (Pritchett, Samji and Hammer 2013).

A credible M&E plan, strategy or system requires data collection using different tools and methods (both simple and complex). The basic tools include interviews, FGDs, observation, photography, video, case studies, stories of change, surveys and questionnaires. On the other hand, the more complex methodologies include guidelines and processes for data selection, analysis and use, as well as data collection. The documented complex methodologies include 'outcome harvesting', 'most significant change', 'qualitative comparative analysis', 'process tracing', 'contribution analysis', 'tracer studies', 'appreciative inquiry', 'quasi-experimental approaches', 'randomised control trials', 'participatory learning and action', 'organisational assessment', and social network analysis' (INTRAC 2017). M&E approach or system is often integrated into 'planning, monitoring and evaluation', or presented as 'planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting'. More recently, M&E has been integrated into learning as 'monitoring, evaluation and learning' or 'planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning' system (Simister and Napier 2019).

Towards maximising the impact of each British pound spent to improve poor peoples' lives, DFID adopts a common conceptual framework for VFM called '4Es' (Beam Exchange Undated). The independent body responsible for scrutinising UK aid defines VFM as "the best use of resources to deliver the desired impact" (ICAI 2011, 1). The 4Es entails 'economy', 'efficiency', 'effectiveness', and 'equity'. The inclusion on equity is conveyor's belt of the message that development is only of value if it is also fair. The 4Es are also tied to inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impacts.



Economy is an assessor of the degree to which inputs are being purchased in the right quantity and at the right price, such as 'were the items of the required standard bought at the lowest possible cost?'



Efficiency is an assessor of how efficiently the project is delivering its outputs, considering the rate at which intervention inputs are converted to outputs and its cost-efficiency, such 'given the number of items bought, how many people used the items for their intended purpose?'



Effectiveness is an assessor of the quality of the intervention's work by assessing the rate at which outputs are converted into outcomes and impacts, and the cost-effectiveness of this conversion. The plausible question is: 'For those people provided with items, has the incidence decreased?'



Equity is an assessor of the degree to which the results of the intervention are equitably or fairly distributed. The plausible question is: 'Have the items reached the poorest people and minority groups in more remote areas, as well as those closer to cities?'

In consideration of the foregoing, ACORN adopts the VFM approach with the following principles:

- 1) The most critical ingredients in delivering value for money are local ownership and leadership, and this will be achieved through sustainable results.
- 2) Reduce reliance on commercial service providers, and deliver more through HMG, by direct execution.
- 3) Increase the use of Nigerian suppliers by testing the local market.
- 4) Spend more on activities, and less on overheads.
- 5) Ensure recovered stolen funds are used for developmental purposes, which are beneficial to all Nigerians, through the promotion of domestic monitoring and oversight.
- 6) Understand 'what works' and 'what does not work', through the use of evidence.
- 7) Present a detailed analysis of VFM benefits achieved across the programme, based on contributions from all implementers (ACORN/ DFID 2018).

2. M&E Related Tasks of ACORN's Social Norms

The M&E related tasks of ACORN's social norms are reviewed under the streams, 'conceptualisation', 'guiding framework', 'baselines and milestones', 'effectiveness', 'accountability', 'lessons', 'social norms component', 'relationship between projects', 'coordination', 'sustainability', and 'consideration by partners'. They are discussed below.



2.1 Conceptualisation

From DFID's conceptualisation, the objectives of ACORN cut across the programme. Curiously, the Global Anti-Corruption Programme (GACP) Business Case by Prosperity Fund mentioned the place of social norms in changing attitudes of citizens towards accepting corrupt practices. This is captured as 'Change behaviours and motivations'. Therefore, the background of social norms approach entails changing citizens' perception and behaviours in a way that is no longer accepting corrupt practices. ActionAid Nigeria is implementing SCRAP-C. ANEEJ is implementing MANTRA. SERAP is implementing 'Nigeria Anti-Corruption Social Norms Project'. YAF's project under ACORN is Y-PAC.



2.2 Guiding framework

The over-arching documents guiding the M&E of ACORN is a TOC, and there is a logical framework. However, the monitoring system that was developed by the Consultant, Itad is based on providing

information and data on the logical framework, using the TOC lenses. In particular, Itad has helped ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C (society and social norms) to involve a comprehensive M&E and learning system. SCRAP-C has a comprehensive M&E framework, which stipulates the tools, methods of data collection, responsibility for action, and reporting mechanism. ActionAid Nigeria adopted the DFID's 4E's. At inception, the focus was on 'economy', such as hotel costs, consultant fees, and choice of venue for events. The introduction of equity into the project was informed by shift in focus to youths and inclusion of Persons with Disabilities (PWDs).

In summary, ActionAid Nigeria adopts a VFM framework that is connected to 'monetary', 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' indicators. Monetary indicators will involve reporting on monetary value of a point on the project's results chain (e.g. an output or an outcome) - in relation to the associated cost. Quantitative indicators will deal with report on how much (in numbers) the project has achieved in relation to the associated cost. Qualitative indicators will report on changes achieved by the project (in descriptive terms, e.g. an improvement in quality), in relation to the associated cost. For ANEEJ's MANTRA, the guiding framework draws on 'supportive society and social norms', namely: 'citizen's capability to resist and act on corruption is strengthened'. The output is indicated in the ACORN's logical framework by 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3. On its part, YAF's Y-PAC has a strategy, which involves developing yearly plan with specific objectives, which can be tracked and reported within the framework of its objective. YAF has adopted ACORN M&E framework with additional or slight modifications to capture, document and report specific changes in social norms in corruption. YAF has also developed a robust M&E plan and data capturing, analysis and reporting template and plan that aim at gathering sufficient evidence on the social norms approach to tackling corruption in Nigeria.



2.3 Baselines and milestones

The baselines for most of the projects were zero because a lot of those things pertain to the things that have happened through ACORN support. And so, at the beginning, most of them were zero. And on the ACORN log frame, there are milestones, and there is an expectation of the individual contribution that each of the components would make. Second, the baseline for ACORN is the baseline for all the three components. By implication, the baselines are not different, but each of those pillars make a collective contribution to what ACORN is doing. From the ACORN-wide log frame, SCRAP-C has six specific indicators, and under each indicator, there are milestones assigned to each of the component.

ANEEJ has a goal to make MANTRA M&E a learning exercise that provides timely, reliable information and knowledge that improves project performance and enables the sharing of key insights and lessons emanating from this innovative project. MANTRA's M&E consists of two outcomes, seven outputs, and 20 indicators (ANEEJ/ MANTRA 2018). The baseline of MANTRA is indicated by low knowledge and practices on anti-corruption by key stakeholders group targeted. By 2020, there should be increased knowledge on corruption and anti-corruption measures by stakeholders group targeted (milestone 1). Their attitude should increase by 2021 (milestone 2), and their practice should increase by end of project (milestone 3). Measuring progress of MANTRA is done by reference to the outcome and output indicators of the ACORN log frame as well as the number of types of stakeholders groups that demonstrate change and increase in knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP).

YAF conducted a KAP survey, which served as the baseline for Y-PAC. This feeds into milestones, which are captured in the ACORN M&E log-frame. However, the ACORN programme allows implementing organisations to set yearly targets, which may be different from the milestones derived from the log-frame and the baseline. Perhaps the purpose of this freedom is to allow implementing organisations to be more innovation while avoiding restrictive programming. This may also be to allow integration of learning which might affect

milestones, hence the approach. As a subset of ACORN, Y-PAC's indicators are derived from the ACORN logical framework. Y-PAC project is reporting on 10 indicators with strength and strong results recorded in 8 of the 10 indicators. YAF has also developed evidence gathering template that is helping the M&E team to collect, analyse and report qualitative information on changes in social norms around corruption issues.



2.4 Effectiveness

Regarding effectiveness, ACORN was designed to be adaptive, and an M&E system is not cast on stone. As the programme adapts and evolves, the M&E system should also adapt and evolve. Curiously, the programme has undergone a number of iterations of the log frame. So, the M&E system is adaptive and responding to what is contained in the programme. The M&E system for partners' project generally respond to revision on the log frame and TOC. In particular, the ACORN log-frame only captures the number of beneficiaries reached by MANTRA. The indicators do not capture changes in KAP on anti-corruption, but MANTRA is collating data on these changes, using tracking sheet on procurement and commitment, pre- and post-test, and KAP survey.



2.5 Accountability

Accountability is possible with the ACORN M&E component. In consideration of the fact that the M&E framework is a mere document, it is the responsibility of the implementing partners to ensure that they do run with the M&E system. However, accountability is assured if the M&E system is well implemented. Again, both the log frame and TOC were designed in collaboration with the downstream partners. Also, the M&E is clearly designed to capture results at different levels, timelines, milestones incorporated as well as roles and responsibilities assigned to ensure accountability, upward and downward. From the perspective of MANTRA by ANEEJ, there is need for a review of the ACORN log-frame to include outcomes.



2.6 Lessons

A number of lessons has been documented in application of the M&E framework of ACORN. From the Medium Term Review Report, there are quite a number of lessons that have been documented. However, one issue that stands out uniquely is the need to provide additional support for the downstream partners through expansion. For ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C, the M&E application is a capacity building function. Second, SCRAP-C provided M&E training for all the downstream partners, including on report writing so that they are better at reporting results. And so, by using the M&E framework, SCRAP-C serves to ensure that there has been a change in paradigm, from reporting activities to reporting concrete results that focus on the log frame. On its part, Y-PAC by YAF is in search of more qualitative data collection methods and tools, capacity development to properly understand M&E framework. From the perspective of MANTRA by ANEEJ, four lessons have been documented. First, it is better to work in supportive form with, rather than antagonising government, on anti-corruption issues. Second, working with local CSOs is more effective in reaching the wider grassroots. Third, anti-corruption activities can be design by the target stakeholders. Fourth, working with religious and traditional groups is more effective in tackling social norms, behaviour and anti-corruption.



2.7 Social norms component

The M&E framework appears to have captured the social norms at the high level, but it has to be applied to all levels. The weight count at the moment at the high level is looking at behaviour change in a way that is less accepting of corruption. This has worked for SCRAP-C to the extent that it is making contributions to the overall framework. For YAF's Y-PAC, although it captures the social norms, there is however room for improvement. This will ensue more qualitative indicators and data collection tools. Though complicated, governance programmes or projects can be better tracked using more qualitative evidence and less quantitative data.

This viewpoint coincides with that of MANTRA by ANEEJ to the effect that the indicators need to be revised to capture changes in KAP on anti-corruption measures. In summary, the M&E framework partly captures the social norms component of ACORN.



2.8 Relationship between projects

From the common logical frame and TOC that bind them the partners together, there is a relationship because it is meant to be individual contributions of each of the project that will deliver the programme outcomes. Involvement of Itad to provide M&E services is to ensure that the workability of this relationship. Such relationship extends to second-tier partners. Within SCRAP-C, ActionAid Nigeria and the consultant,

Itad are working on creating a community of partners of all the M&E staff of all the downstream partners for sharing experiences under SCRAP-C. This will be extended to other ACORN partners. For YAF, however, the essence of having different projects targeting different social norms relating to corruption in Nigeria was to achieve complementarity. This also shows in the joint implementation of social norms projects by partners, such as the 'Roundtable on Behavioural Insights and Policy Making in Nigeria, organised by ANEEJ and ActionAid Nigeria (September 3, 2018).



2.9 Coordination

In terms of coordination from the M&E perspective, critical decisions on ACORN are taken at the steering committee meetings. Within SCRAP-C, ActionAid Nigeria leads the contractual and financial coordination, while the consultant, Itad leads the M&E coordination. These coordination activities feed into the quarterly lessons learnt meetings held by SCRAP-C. The outcome of the quarterly meetings also feeds into the development of the quarterly report that is submitted to DFID. The consultant, Itad intends to extend this model to other partners' projects by ANEEJ and ASI, on behalf of DFID. This will provide opportunity for assessing achievements and challenges. A possible question is: Are their commonalities in the challenges that partners face, and how can they overcome such challenges? For YAF, however, there is no coordination amongst ACORN partners. Rather, what obtains is a kind of exchange visit or invitation to witness events and activities and that has less to do with coordination. Towards addressing lack of coordination, MANTRA by ANEEJ has conducted mapping for the design of social norms activities. Yet, coordination can be done at the levels of funding, planning, M&E, implementation, and knowledge sharing.



2.10 Sustainability

Another important issue that can be derived from the M&E is sustainability. ACORN partners are already integrating anti-corruption into every work. Whereas, they are involved in other work apart from anti-corruption, the lead implementers are encouraging partners to begin to take up some of these issues into their own projects. For example, MANTRA by ANEEJ and SCRAP-C by ActionAid Nigeria have been developed as specific brands. Within SCRAP-C, the Centre for Citizens with Disabilities' lead of PWDs, working with disabilities persons' organisations, and the leadership of organisations are already mainstreaming anti-corruption work into what they do. In particular, MANTRA by ANEEJ is working towards periodic measures for long-term changes in social norms. On its part, YAF's Y-PAC has strong sustainability component that focuses on building the capacity of government agencies and implementing partners including youth and youth groups and ensure they are drivers of the project. This is tracked and reported consistently.



2.11 Consideration by partners

There are other considerations from the various partners. The M&E consultant, Itad is considering the holding of a programme-wide meeting where partners would present their individual cases. SCRAP-C is suggesting two mechanisms for enhanced coordination: (1) Hold quarterly meetings within the project, and (2) Hold bi-annual meeting programme-wide. In this case, lessons, achievements, challenges (including how to address them) can be discussed exhaustively. From the point of view of YAF, there should be ACORN Partners' Workplan Harmonisation and Coordination Meetings. This will provide opportunity for each partner to share their work plan and allow others to pick areas to collaborate based on the presented work plan. Monitoring of such plan is also essential.



Part IV

Conclusion

4.1 Introduction

This study, in the main, sought to examine the effectiveness of the social norms-based approaches to anti-corruption as applied by the principal partners under ACORN. It was inspired by the increasing centrality of social norms in achieving sustained change in behaviour towards corruption. In implementing the three-in-one research project, a combination of desk research and interviews was deployed as a methodological tool. From the desk research, there are three top challenges in anti-corruption. They include (1) corruption is not a moral problem, (2) one size does not fit all in anti-corruption, and (3) behaviour change is a process, and not a demonstration. From the systems-based analysis, the study notes the factors of corruption as 'drivers', 'enablers', 'effects', and 'mental models'. The desk research also reviewed the concept of social norms, which provides a huge web of complexities.

The several lessons of applying the social norms approach have been documented. The desk research would form the basis for distilling critical actionable points for policy makers and practitioners about social norms change and corruption. Also, the lessons formed the point of departure for the implementation of objectives 2, 3 and 4 of this project.

ACORN's assumptions recognises the place of citizens in shifting behaviour for a change in social norms. Also, the review of ACORN's M&E related tasks shows the place of 4Es ('economy', 'efficiency', 'effectiveness', and 'equity') or VFM ('value for money') as a guiding principle of DFID's support to improving the lives of the poor. Thus, ACORN emphasises local ownership and leadership, reduced reliance on commercial service providers, increased the use of Nigerian suppliers, spending more on activities and less on overheads, and ensuring use of recovered funds on developmental projects.

4.2 Lessons from Social Norms Application in Anti-Corruption

From the evidence in theory and practice, some salient lessons can be gleaned for anti-corruption practitioners (Heise and Manji 2016; Scharbatke-Church and Hathaway 2017B; ANEEJ 2018; Jackson and Köbis 2018; Scharbatke-Church and Schaitkin 2018; Chigas and Scharbatke-Church 2019B).

1. There are obvious limitations and frustrations in the current state of literature on social norms and corruption. Thus the literature is in search of improvements for the purpose of clarifying key concepts and integrating the salient points into programming. Coherent and rigorous analysis of what goes on “inside people’s heads,” is lacking, and so, practitioners clearly need a better definition of social norms, and to be contextually grounded about how norms change. Available evidence suggests that most practitioners of social norms in anti-corruption seemingly did so without integrating key aspects of the academic theory and experimental evidence on the subject (Scharbatke-Church and Hathaway 2017B). This report will serve as a basis for distilling critical actionable points for policy makers and practitioners about social norms change and corruption.
2. The social norms approach, though distinct, forms an integral part of the entire anti-corruption strategies, such as rule-changing, enforcement, transparency, organisational and managerial, as well as social accountability. Rule-changing focuses on retooling specific anti-corruption laws and regulations of formal institutions. Enforcement pertains to monitoring of the anti-corruption elements of the laws, such as audit institutions, the judiciary, and anti-corruption watchdogs. Transparency focuses on using rules of public disclosure and right to information to generate information for anti-corruption. Changing individual behaviour through ‘soft laws’, such as code of conduct, or changing economic incentives through a new salary structure are embedded in organisational and managerial strategies. Social accountability involves the holding of government to account through monitoring, disclosure, and advocacy by the social actors, such as NGOs, political pressure groups, social movements, and religious leaders (Jackson and Köbis 2018). By implication, the social norms approach is not the only answer to changing social norms.
Therefore, all factors that drive and enable behaviour and acts of corruption must be understood to develop an effective, multi-faceted strategy (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas 2019).
3. There are possible consequences in ignoring social norms in anti-corruption programming. (Scharbatke-Church and Chigas 2016B; Chigas and Scharbatke-Church 2019B). First, ignoring social norms has the potential to undermine the positive momentum generated by good work in other fields, such as integrity promotion efforts. Second, ignoring social norms in anti-corruption can actually backfire, thereby exacerbating corruption itself. From the social norms theory, awareness raising can call attention to the behavior and make it worse by creating the impression that the behaviour is ubiquitous. Third, ignoring social norms in anti-corruption can also endanger people’s lives. “Efforts to support “positive deviants” or “trendsetters,” or to address social norms in a professional organization (like the police), without considering the secondary, yet powerful, indirect norms, can expose participants to danger” (Chigas and Scharbatke-Church 2019B).

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4. There are harsher sanctions in developing countries and FCAS. The mentality, “us vs. them” is being solidified among groups due to conflict. This mentality breeds distrust, fear and, at the extreme, dehumanisation of the “other”. People are likely to be more “loyal” to their group, and the social sanction for being “disloyal” (i.e. breaching a social norm held by the group) is likely to be stronger. In effect, the people who breach social norms, such as involving any interaction with the “other” are branded as traitors, ostracized, threatened, and sometimes attacked or killed. In CAR, for example, “if someone asks for a service, you are required to do it, even if it goes against your own ethics. To refuse is to put in opposition, and this can be dangerous” (Chigas and Scharbatke-Church 2019b). By implication, the groups commanding loyalty in these contexts should be involved in the norms of corruption must be changed.
 5. The consequences of being sanctioned are more serious. Common sanctions for breaching social norms include ostracisation, harm to reputation, and diminished support. These sanctions have far more serious consequences in FCAS. “When resources are scarce (due to war, lack of investment, etc.), and the government does not or cannot provide security or services, and can even be the perpetrator of violence threatening the group (think, for example, Syria or Afghanistan), people have to rely more on their networks for basic human needs: food, shelter, safety, healthcare. The vital nature of group membership is so entrenched in CAR, there is a Sango proverb for those who are left out: “Pity the man who is alone” (Chigas and Scharbatke-Church 2019B). Therefore, the groups responsible for sanctioning individuals need to be addressed, so as to turn the sanctions against the perpetrators of the norms of corruption.
 6. It is important to engage with people at a young age when they are beginning to “form” social norms to internalise them. This draws on the “life cycle analysis”, which is helpful for aid organisations. Curiously, some individuals and NGOs are already acting this script. The author, Robtel Neajai Pailey wrote a children’s book, Gbagba, to build a movement of children who would question corruption, and embarrass adults into more authentic, ethical living. Gbagba uses folkloric tradition, which enables children to learn about virtues and vices. “The book has been placed on the list of supplemental readers for 3rd to 5th graders in Liberia and for Primary 3 in Ghana, piloted in 30 schools, and turned into a song, music video, radio programme, and stage play” (Jackson and Köbis 2018, 36). Second, the NGO, Step Up Nigeria envisions that every Nigerian child has access to anti-corruption literature and tools. It launched a new comic book featuring ‘Tope’, ‘Aminu’, and ‘Amaka’ as ‘The Anti-Corruption Superheroes’ (TACS). Their very young ages, notwithstanding, TACS understand the dangers of corruption and chose to stand against corrupt activities in their community. Second, ANEEJ has set up a ‘Centre for the Study of Corruption’ to undertake strategic research on topical issues around corruption and governance as well as advance open government partnership principles. On annual basis, ANEEJ ‘Centre for the Study of Corruption’ holds one-week course on anti-corruption leading to enhance the knowledge of young activist in Nigeria. However, this view reflects only one of multiple theories on social norms development. Yet, for some academics, social norms vary from context to context based on one’s social group, cues in the environment, and expectations about what is typical and appropriate based on those cues. Therefore, social norms are not formed and internalized at young age (Scharbatke-Church and Hathaway 2017B).

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7. There are lessons in building, breaking and shifting a norm. First, building a new norm can often be easier and more strategic than attempting to dismantle a harmful one. Second, shifting associated norms will be easier by breaking one norm. Building a norm of saying 'no to giving and accepting bribe' would be a departing point to dismantling the rather toxic corruption. "Perhaps breaking the norm would help to shift associated norms, such as not escalating a corrupt practice due to the social disapproval that would follow" (ANEEJ 2018).
 8. The potential of social norms to serve as a driver or an influencer of corrupt behaviour depends on the contexts, including the form of corruption being considered. This is supported by the established norms in different contexts, such as Indonesians' korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme, (corruption, collusion, and nepotism), Indians' riswat (bribery of public officials), Georgians' chackobili (corrupt), and Egyptians' 'facilitation fees', Tunisia's 'a rotten fish starts at the head', as well as Filipinos' acceptance of corruption as kalakaran (a way of life). Developing effective responses to corrupt behaviours depends on a 'contextual grounded analysis' of why people are engaging in such behaviours. It is therefore, important to understand the context before anti-corruption interventions.
 9. Interventions that are intended to shift social norms are unintentionally missing the target. This is evidenced in intervention design as well as monitoring and evaluation. For example, attitudes and behaviors are commonly being mistaken for social norms. These are different types of change, and thus require different strategies if interventions are to be effective.
 10. The purpose of social norms approach is to relieve and shift social norms. This would enable the effectiveness of other interventions, such as codes of conduct, salary increases, legal reform, enforcement, and civil society oversight.
 11. There is a mismatch in social norms application. For example, social norms change is said to have occurred even with interventions that focus solely on measuring and changing individual attitudes or beliefs. This helps to explain the relevance of ANEEJ's current work 'Applying social norms in anti-corruption'.

4.3 Key Message on ACORN and its Social Norms

From this scoping study, the following key messages are extracted.

1. Most of the policy documents guiding ACORN also guide the project implementation by partners. However, individual partners also support their work with internal policies. On the other hand, DFID also relied on the outcomes of the baseline studies conducted by partners.
2. It will take a long to change the social norms of corruption in Nigeria, particularly because it requires collective action. This is supported by the views expressed by some of the ACORN partners that, the five-year period would not be enough to achieve change in social norms of corruption.

3. All partners' projects are directed at achieving the overall goal of ACORN, namely: to reduce corruption in Nigeria, in view of its impact on development. ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C seeks to address citizens' attitude towards corruption in Nigeria. ANEEJ's MANTRA seeks to ensure return of stolen assets stashed in the West, strengthen citizens' capacity to 'keep an eye' on returned loot, and ensure returned loot is used for purpose meant. For SERAP's project, the purpose is to investigate why people behave the way they do concerning corruption, and build a new way of looking at corruption. YAF's Y-PAC seeks to engage youths to become active advocates in the fight against corruption.
4. All partners' projects are national in coverage. ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C is present in Jigawa, Kaduna and Kano (North-west), Lagos (South-west), Enugu (South-east), Akwa-Ibom (South-south), and FCT (North-central). ANEEJ's MANTRA appears to have a wide coverage, compared to other projects with presence in 19 states of the six geo-political zones of the country (as at December 2019). SERAP is also in the six geo-political zones. YAF's Y-PAC is present in Akwa-Ibom, Cross Rivers and Rivers (South-south), Kano (North-west), FCT in (North-central), and Lagos (South-west).
5. All assumptions of partners' projects point to the pervasiveness corruption in Nigeria, and most assumptions point to the fact that they are being proven right. Particularly for ACORN, a shift in citizens' behaviour is required for social norms change, and the people are central to this change. For ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C, people are docile, and are not active, social norms of corruption are context- and sector-specific, the problem of addressing corruption is huge, and there is the belief that everyone in Nigeria is corrupt is proven hard to erase. For ANEEJ, everybody yearns for action to be taken against corruption, and the anti-corruption stance of APC-led FG will continue to provide an enabling environment MANTRA. Also, when corruption is reduced, poverty will also reduce. For SERAP's project, more Nigerians feel bad about corruption, but a larger percentage of Nigerians would not take steps against corruption. For YAF's Y-PAC, people would fight corruption if they are mobilised and informed about corruption, and youths are not being engaged because they not mobilised.
6. ACORN principal partners agree to the fact that collective action is needed to succeed, and their interventions have been designed to further this statement. ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C works within the citizens' space. ANEEJ's MANTRA involves everybody to achieve results. SERAP needs citizens' receptiveness of its project. And YAF's Y-PAC's activities involve students and youth groups. More fundamentally, focus should be on social networks because changes occur through networks.
7. It is anticipated that anti-corruption becomes a norm. In general, DFID's ACORN emphasises the place of trust. ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C anticipates a social rejection of people involved in corruption. For ANEEJ's MANTRA, behaviour change would lead to stronger resistance to corruption, and actions (individual and collective) would pose resistance to corruption. SERAP anticipates that people will change their behaviour that encourages corruption over time. YAF's Y-PAC anticipates the involvement of more youths in resistance to corruption. However, some unexpected results are being achieved.
8. ACORN partners use a range of activities to drive their projects. They include media engagement, citizens' engagement, policy engagement, and private sector engagement (by ActionAid Nigeria); monitoring, advocacy, training, policy dialogue, stakeholders engagement, town hall meetings, dissemination events, public lectures (by ANEEJ); research, reporting, launching, advocacy (by SERAP); and capacity building, project management and research (by YAF).

9. There are similarities in the methods and tools being deployed. DFID did not suggest any methods and tools due to lack of expertise in social norms. ActionAid Nigeria adopts messaging/ campaigns, fliers in branded bags, and social audit by citizens or 'score card'. ANEEJ adopts collective action, infographics, press release, and platform of traditional and religious leaders. SERAP uses education, media engagement, infographs of reports, animation, and workshops for students and government officials. YAF adopts technology and capacity building in its work.
10. Although ACORN is still at the information stage, progress has been made in creating accountability hurdles by DFID. ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C has inspired more citizens to report corruption, and to join anti-corruption campaign. ANEEJ's MANTRA showcases a number of results: Abacha II (\$322.5 million) not re-looted, and helps to attain SDGs; Bayelsa changed decision on use of Alamiyeseigha loot (\$900,000) to build health centres; NFIU has been passage and signed into law; official gazette on asset recovery; beneficiaries of cash transfers are blowing whistle on corrupt officials; Delta is awaiting return of Ibori loot; and OGP has been domesticated in Delta and Edo States. SERAP is currently at post-launch advocacy of its report. YAF's Y-PAC has inspired citizens to organise training and advocacy sessions in anti-corruption, and some protagonists of vote buying and selling have renounced involvement.
11. ACORN has a lot of barriers, such as misinformation of lack of access to quality information, biased investigation, weak public confidence, and extremely low baseline. In response, DFID does not engage politically, but responds at the programmatic levels, avoids diplomatic row due to lobbying, and supports strong advocacy and reputation scrutiny. ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C encounters cognitive and policy barriers. In response, ActionAid Nigeria identifies where people aggregate, examine their common belief, and thereafter insert anti-corruption campaign. This pertains to messages and reference networks that would resonate with the people and their kind of lives are needed. ANEEJ's MANTRA is being hindered by entrenched attitudes and citizens' apathy towards progress being made. In response, ANEEJ majorly involves citizens in monitoring disbursement of Abacha II, training of citizens and CSOs, media coverage and periodic release of information on the project. For SERAP, the barriers are late release of funds and lack of funds for the partner government agency. SERAP acknowledges that it is racing against the clock. YAF's Y-PAC is being hindered by strong opposition from school authorities. In response, YAF rides on the back of students' association to address opposition from school authorities.
12. It is generally acknowledged that there are risks in anti-corruption work, and different forms of mitigation are being deployed. Social norms work goes against the flow, which is 'corruption pays'. Therefore, it may not work. This is a risk to ACORN. Mitigating this risk entails close monitoring of ACORN by DFID, in addition to establishing a robust M&E system. For SCRAP-C, the risks include compromise of the foot soldiers, a legal framework without a social norms lens, and 'short-termism'. Action Aid' relies on internal systems and legal reforms. Risks to MANTRA pertain to centre insecurity and spread of negative information. In response, ANEEJ has developed a risk register and a risk matrix for MANTRA. In some cases, monitoring work is suspended to avoid risks. For SERAP, it is also insecurity in some parts of the North and past experiences. SERAP's mitigation strategies entail assignment of identification tags to its field researchers, convenience work in the hot-bed of conflict, questions are used to address past experience and mere perception. YAF also faces the risks of working in democratic settings and with government agencies. YAF exercises patience in working with government agencies.

13. According to ACORN, citizens have the power to decide what behaviour they want to adopt. In general, influencers play key roles in driving the partners' projects. ActionAid Nigeria engages social media influencers, such as Frank Dunga and Femi Durotoye; moral institutions; as well as town and gown. ANEEJ involves media (social and conventional), engages with traditional rulers, religious leaders and government officials at all levels. For SERAP, the order of priority is media, religious leaders, traditional rulers, and celebrities. YAF has engaged celebrities, such as Tuface, Simi and P-Square. Religious leaders and traditional rulers are also key influencers in YAF's Y-PAC.
14. The principal partners under the ACORN include ActionAid Nigeria, ANEEJ, SERAP, and YAF. Others are UNODC and Adams Smith International. However, the principal partners engage second-tier partners in their various ACORN projects. It is also possible for all the partners to take a common position on what needs to change, and the solution to the problems.

4.4 Summary of Findings of ACORN's M&E Review



The independent body responsible for scrutinising UK aid, ICAI sets the tone for understanding the 4Es ('economy', 'efficiency', 'effectiveness', and 'equity') or VFM ('value for money') as a guiding principle of DFID's support to improving the lives of the poor. This has consistently influenced the implementation of the ACORN programme to provide local ownership and leadership, reduce reliance on commercial service providers, increase the use of Nigerian suppliers, spend more on activities and less on overheads, and ensure use of recovered funds on developmental projects. Through understanding of 'what works' and 'what does not work', there would be evidence of VFM benefits. From the review of the M&E framework of ACORN, we conclude as follows:

1. The GACP Business Case by Prosperity Fund recognises 'change behaviours and motivations'. This emphasises the place of social norms in changing attitudes of citizens towards accepting corrupt practices. From DFID's conceptualisation, the objectives of ACORN and the projects by principal partners are being implemented to change citizens' perceptions and behaviours to reject corruption. This objective cuts across Action Nigeria's SCRAP-C, ANEEJ's MANTRA, SERAP's Nigeria Anti-Corruption Social Norms Project, and YAF's Y-PAC.
2. DFID's M&E framework is majorly guided by the TOC and a logical framework, and inspired by the 4Es or VFM principles. This is being adopted by the project partners. ACORN's M&E Consultant, Itad has furthered the framework by using the TOC lenses. In particular, ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C initially focused on 'economy', such as hotel costs, consultant fees, and choice of venue for events. However, there has been a shift in focus to youths and inclusion of PWDs with the introduction of equity into the project. Thus ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C

adopts a VFM framework that is connected to 'monetary', 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' indicators. ANEEJ's MANTRA adopts a framework that draws on 'supportive society and social norms', namely: 'citizen's capability to resist and act on corruption is strengthened'. Also, YAF's Y-PAC has adopted ACORN M&E framework with additional or slight modifications to capture, document and report specific changes in the social norms in corruption.

3. At inception of the ACORN programme, the baselines for most of the projects were zero. From the milestones, implementation of the individual projects is expected to contribute to the overall goal of ACORN. In other words, each of those pillars make a collective contribution to the ACORN programme. However, ACORN creates room for partners to set yearly targets, which may be different from the milestones derived from the logical framework and the baseline. ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C has six indicators with milestones attached to each component. ANEEJ's MANTRA has an M&E, comprising two outcomes, seven outputs, and 20 indicators. Its baseline is indicated by low knowledge and practices on anti-corruption by key stakeholders. The baseline of YAF's Y-PAC draws on the project's KAP survey. This feeds into the milestones, which are further captured in the ACORN logical framework.
4. DFID's ACORN has undergone a number of iterations of the logical framework. This is in consideration of the fact that an M&E system is not cast on stone. In general, the M&E system for partners' project also respond to revisions on the logical framework and TOC. However, there are some gaps. For example, the ACORN logical framework only captures the number of beneficiaries reached by ANEEJ's MANTRA. As a result, the indicators do not capture changes in KAP on anti-corruption. In response, MANTRA is collating data on these changes, using tracking sheet on procurement and commitment, pre- and post-test, and KAP survey.
5. Accountability is guaranteed in the various projects with full implementation of the M&E of ACORN. However, it is the responsibility of implementing partners to ensure the use of the M&E, which is a mere document. A selling point is that both the logical framework and the TOC were designed in collaboration with the downstream partners. However, the ACORN logical framework is in need of a review to capture outcomes.
6. An intriguing aspect of ACORN's M&E pertains to the numerous lessons documented thus far. First, the M&E application is a capacity building function, and this resonates in the training of downstream partners to report concrete results in lieu of activities. Second, there are better results in working collaboratively with government in lieu of antagonistic posture. Third, the M&E application reveals the strength in working with local CSOs to reach the wider grassroots instead of having a 'briefcase' template or mentality. Fourth, the target population can be very effective in designing anti-corruption programmes. Fifth, traditional rulers and religious leaders are more effective in tackling the social norms of corruption. ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C adopts this mechanism as 'moral institutions engagement'. More importantly, the lessons show the need to expand the ACORN programme through additional support to the downstream partners.
7. DFID's ACORN has an M&E framework that partly captures social norms, particularly at the topmost level. The weight count focuses on behaviour change to socially reject corruption. ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C has sufficiently applied this in contribution to the overall framework. However, YAF's Y-PAC is in search of improvement to ensue more qualitative indicators and data collection tools. This coincides with ANEEJ's MANTRA in pursuit of revised indicators to capture changes in KAP on anti-corruption measures. In summary, the M&E framework partly captures the social norms component of ACORN.

8. There is a relationship between the projects under the ACORN programme as evidenced in joint programming. However, DFID has retained the services of Itad to ensure a functional relationship amongst the partners, which would extend to second-tier partners. In particular, a community of practice has been created within ActionAid Nigeria's SCRAP-C. It is envisaged that this will be extended to other ACORN partners. In sum, differences in projects is to achieve complementarity in applying social norms to anti-corruption in Nigeria.
9. As part of coordination, there is a steering committee meeting of the ACORN programme, wherein critical decisions are taken. Within SCRAP-C, ActionAid Nigeria leads the contractual and financial coordination, while Itad leads the M&E coordination. From the quarterly meetings, reports are submitted to DFID. The consultant, Itad intends to extend this model to other partners' projects by ANEEJ and Adam Smith International (ASI), on behalf of DFID. However, a partner like YAF is of the opinion that no coordination exists amongst the ACORN partners. In response, ANEEJ has conducted mapping for the design of social norms activities.
10. Sustainability is another important issue that is derivable from M&E. As a result, anti-corruption is already being diffused into the activities of the project partners under ACORN. MANTRA by ANEEJ and SCRAP-C by ActionAid Nigeria have been developed as specific brands. In particular, MANTRA by ANEEJ is working towards periodic measures for long-term changes in social norms. YAF's Y-PAC focuses on building the capacity of government agencies and youth groups as drivers of the project. This is part of YAF's sustainability plan.
11. Top consideration by project partners pertains to the holding of quarterly M&E meetings within a project, as well as bi-annual meeting programme-wide. From SCRAP-C's perspective, this would create room for knowledge sharing on how to address potential challenges and scale-up on achievements. Also, YAF's Y-PAC recommends ACORN Partners Workplan Harmonisation and Coordination Committee Meetings as a platform for sharing workplan. This would enable partners to pick areas of possible collaboration and work on co-monitoring of such plans.

4.5 Proposals for Further Programming in ACORN

In consideration of the views expressed by the various ACORN partners through their leaders, we offer the following proposals for future application of social norms in anti-corruption programming:

1. Efforts must be made to delete all forms of inertia in the ACORN society's component, with more attention given to the youths. This should be made to factor into more support for youth mobilisation in anti-corruption.
2. Cooperation between ACORN partners should be enhanced through periodic review meetings that will be held twice a year. This will afford partners to bare their minds on their individual projects, the progress they made, barriers and risks, and how they addressing them.



3. Partners should also be encouraged to work together in the area of data generation to inform their social norms-based interventions.
4. Programmatic activities with a percentage for collaboration before approval by DFID is another way of enhancing cooperation between partners.
5. Partners should deploy more efforts towards involving social networks in their interventions. This is because of the potential of a network to enhance messages that would resonate with the people, and serve as reference group.
6. Partners should push for legal reforms that would validate social rejection of corruption. By implication, the legal validation of social rejection would drive individuals far away from corrupt tendencies.
7. Partners should be involved in design of future programme design. This will shed light on the realities, compared to theories and assumptions.
8. Consideration should be given to extending the life of ACORN, especially its society component. As observed in the field, changing social norms takes generation. A five year project will not be enough to address this issue. It must be consistent for a while, even with the implementers for at least, about 10 years.

4.6 Proposals for Future M&E Activities



From the review of ACORN's M&E related tasks, we offer the following proposals for further M&E activities.

1. Targeted stakeholders should be involved in the design of future M&E activities of ACORN. This should include local CSOs, moral institutions, and relevant anti-corruption agencies.
2. ACORN's future M&E framework should be devoted to providing more robust data collection methods and tools. This would allow for innovative and coordinated collection, analysis and reporting of evidence.
3. The M&E indicators should be sufficiently revised to capture changes in KAP on anti-corruption measures, and social norms in particular.
4. The capacity of project implementing partners should be further developed for their understanding of the M&E framework.
5. The VFM model, notwithstanding, ACORN should emphasise regular field visits to implementing states and partners. This would help to track and adjust project activities and plans for the purpose of generating appropriate results.
6. A learning platform should be established to serve as a coordination point of ACORN's M&E. This will ensure proper coordination, thereby erasing the perception that there is no coordination amongst ACORN partners.

7. DFID should encourage a more collaboration between partners' projects in the states where they have presence. Such collaboration would explore opportunities for common activities in a way that delivers the ACORN outcomes.
8. The consultant, Itad should be encourage partners to commence the proposed learning sessions with each project partner, first on a quarterly basis, and second bi-annually and programme-wide. This will be a platform where everybody sits together to assess achievements and challenges.
9. Specific brands, such MANTRA and SCRAP-C should be left in the hands of the implementing partners, post-ACORN programme. The lead implementers or partners should step up efforts at encouraging partners to take up some of these issues into their own programme. This should be done in association with the downstream partners.
10. ACORN's M&E should be re-tooled to include an effective communication plan. This will help to ensure the application of ACORN's M&E to social norms. Also, this will factor into (1) meetings within the project, and (2) bi-annual meeting programme-wide. In this case, lessons, achievements, challenges (including how to address them) can be discussed exhaustively.
11. Perhaps, the bi-annual meetings can be formalised under the banner of ACORN Partners Workplan Harmonisation and Coordination Meetings for effective knowledge sharing.

4.7 Proposals for further research in ACORN



In the course of this scoping study, some questions are in need of systematic investigation to provide deeper understanding of ACORN. They are as follows:

1. How does ActionAid Nigeria work with various groups? How do their M&E component affect changes in social norms?
2. How does the monitoring of cash transfers by ANEEJ encourage beneficiaries to report corruption?
3. How is SERAP's actions supporting youth mobilisation for anti-corruption?
4. How has YAF's project enabled the movement from institutions to processes?
5. What are the social drivers of the economy of corruption in Nigeria?
6. Are the drivers of social norms of corruption in Nigeria peculiar to Nigeria?

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Appendix I

Inception Memo on Applying Social Norms in Anti-Corruption Programming



1. Introduction

The United Kingdom (UK)'s Department for International Development (DFID) in Nigeria is currently implementing the Anti-Corruption in Nigeria Programme (ACORN) to support Nigerian authorities and civil society in reducing corruption for five years (2017-2021). The three main outputs of the overarching programme include: (1) 'stronger sanctions regime', (2) 'supportive society and social norms', and (3) 'results, evidence, communications and programme coordination'. The first entails supporting Nigerian authorities (including anti-corruption agencies) to put in place effective legislation and public policies to combat corruption, and to ensure looters are effectively investigated, prosecuted and convicted. The second is intended to support Nigerian civil society to maintain public support for anti-corruption and progressively change social norms that currently facilitate (or even encourage) corruption. Thus, the second stream complements the first stream, which are regular traditional approaches to anti-corruption, such as institutional strengthening and a stronger sanctions regime.

ACORN's society component is being implemented by four principal national civil society organisations (CSOs) partners, namely: Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice (ANEEJ), ActionAid Nigeria, Youth Alive Foundation (YAF) and Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP). Each of these principal national partners have been working with various segments of the society to address corruption by changing social norms and encourage behaviours that will increasingly disapprove of corruption and take action against corrupt practices. The context and coverage of the four principal partners in the ACORN's society stream provide a unique opportunity for a comprehensive investigation. Also, a framework for coordinating the activities of the various partners on ACORN's supportive society and social norms component is currently lacking. Thus, ANEEJ has retained the services of Dr. Oscar E. Ubhenin of Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma as a consultant to provide strategic research underpinning and coordinating function for applying social norms by the four partners under ACORN.



2. Consultancy Purpose

The overall goal of this consultancy is to examine the effectiveness of the social norms-based approaches applied by the principal partners under ACORN in addressing corruption in Nigeria. The specific objectives of this project are to:

- (1) Establish a comprehensive research underpinning for the application of a social norms approach in anti-corruption programming and reforms generally.
- (2) Clarify, justify and determine the specific policy and contextual assumptions underpinning the social norms approaches adopted in each project under ACORN.
- (3) Identify and evaluate the risks involved in the application of a social norms approach in anti-corruption programming generally and in the specific context of ACORN and recommend appropriate action.

(4) Examine and determine the appropriateness of the monitoring and evaluation framework of the ACORN programme for capturing the social norms components of its projects and activities – including baselines, statement of outcomes, measuring impact and documenting lessons learned - and make necessary recommendations.



3. Methodology

The consultant envisages that this project will entail a combination of desk research and interviews. The desk research will help to draw on current literature, while the interviews with principal partners of ACORN will provide insights into the subject matter, where necessary. Other relevant experts and stakeholders will also be interviewed at different stages of the project. The technical team of ANEEJ will help to refine and narrow the scope for appropriateness (see the draft work plan, please).



4. Audience and Use

This consultancy will factor into the third main output of the overarching programme, namely: results, evidence, communication and programme coordination. The report(s) will initially be for the private consumption of ANEEJ and other partners in the UK's ACORN. However, there may be need to revise the report(s) for the wider donor community and public consumption. Ultimately, the report(s) would be helpful in future programming on anti-corruption. It is also envisaged that credible data and robust evidences will be generated for the writing and publication of an academic paper at the end of this project.



Appendix II

Programme Related Interview Guide for DFID/ ACORN

Dear sir or madam,

This interview is further to the implementation of the project, 'Applying Social Norms in Anti-Corruption Programming', as part of 'Supportive Society and Social Norms' component of the 'Anti-Corruption in Nigeria' (ACORN) programme. We seek to understand the social norms based interventions as conceptualised and implemented by the UK's DFID.

You are, therefore, requested to respond to the questions below, according to your knowledge and experience of the subject matter. Please, be assured that your answers will be treated in confidence as the data will be used for the study purpose only.

Organisation	
Address	
Date of Consultation / Meeting	
Venue of Consultation / Meeting	
Leader of Engagement Team	

1. Please, tell us about the work you do at DFID?
2. What informed the ACORN programme?
3. What problem(s) do the ACORN programme seek to address?
4. What is the target population in the ACORN programme?
5. Is the ACORN programme directed at a particular tribe or faith? Please, give details.
6. Did DFID conduct a baseline evaluation at commencement of the ACORN programme? If yes, what aspects of the findings of the evaluation were specific to social norms on corruption in Nigeria?
7. What is the geographic area of coverage of the social norms in the ACORN programme?
8. Does any policy document guide the ACORN programme?
9. What are DFID's assumptions in including the society component of the ACORN programme?
10. Have the assumptions been proven right or wrong since implementation of the programme?
11. To what extent does the social norms programme implementation require a collective action?
12. Are there specific activities that the ACORN project partners are expected to carry out based on the social norms approach in anti-corruption?

13. Did DFID suggest methods and tools for implementing the social norms-based interventions?

14. What are the anticipated outcomes of the society component of the ACORN programme?

15. Do you think progress is being made in implementation of the society component of the ACORN?

16. If response to 15 above is in the affirmative, is the progress different from anticipated outcomes?

17. Please, tell us about the progress in implementing the society component of the ACORN programme?
(Please, specify for social norms).

18. In your opinion, are there barriers to the effective implementation of the society component of the ACORN programme?
(Please, specify for social norms).

19. How is DFID addressing these barriers?

20. Do you think there are risks in implementation of the society component of the ACORN programme?

21. Does DFID have any mitigation plan for these risks?

22. From your work at DFID, who are the main influencers of social norms in Nigeria?
(a) Media (b) Celebrities (c) Traditional leaders (d) Religious leaders (e) Others, specify

23. At what point does the society component inter-face with the other components of the ACORN programme?

24. Who are the principal partners in the ACORN programme?
(Please, specify for social norms).

25. Is there room for enhanced cooperation among the ACORN partners in the area of social norms?

26. Do you have any question for us?

THANK YOU!

Appendix III



Monitoring and Evaluation Related Interview Guide for DFID/ ACORN Experts

Dear sir or madam,

This interview is further to the implementation of the project, 'Applying Social Norms in Anti-Corruption Programming', as part of 'Supportive Society and Social Norms' component of the 'Anti-Corruption in Nigeria' (ACORN) programme. We seek to understand the social norms based interventions as conceptualised and implemented by the UK's DFID.

You are, therefore, requested to respond to the questions below, according to your knowledge and experience of the subject matter. Please, be assured that your answers will be treated in confidence as the data will be used for the study purpose only.

Organisation	
Address	
Date of Consultation / Meeting	
Venue of Consultation / Meeting	
Leader of Engagement Team	

1. What are the objectives of the ACORN programme as conceptualised by DFID?
(Please, specify for the society component of the programme).
2. What framework is guiding the monitoring and evaluation of the ACORN programme?
3. Is there a distinct framework for the society component of the ACORN programme?
4. What are the baselines and milestones of the ACORN programme?
5. Are the baselines and milestones different for the society component?
6. Do you think the M&E framework is effective in determining the ACORN programme impact?
7. Do you think the M&E framework will ensure accountability from the ACORN partners?
8. What lessons have been documented in the course of your application of the M&E framework?
9. Do you think the M&E framework of the ACORN programme appropriately captures the social norms?
10. Is there any relationship between the various projects by partners under the ACORN programme?
11. What form of coordination currently exists amongst the ACORN programme partners?
12. What kind of framework can be adopted for coordinating the various projects implemented by the ACORN partners?
13. What is your understanding of sustainability as part of the framework for monitoring and evaluating the various social norms interventions under the ACORN programme?
14. Do you have any question for us?

THANK YOU!



Appendix IV

Programme Related Interview Guide for ACORN Partners

Dear sir or madam,

This interview is further to the implementation of the project, 'Applying Social Norms in Anti-Corruption Programming', as part of 'Supportive Society and Social Norms' component of the 'Anti-Corruption in Nigeria' (ACORN) programme. We seek to understand the social norms based interventions by the partners in the ACORN programme.

You are, therefore, requested to respond to the questions below, according to your knowledge and experience of the subject matter. Please, be assured that your answers will be treated in confidence as the data will be used for the study purpose only.

Organisation	
Address	
Date of Consultation / Meeting	
Venue of Consultation / Meeting	
Leader of Engagement Team	

1. What is your project title for the ACORN programme?
2. What informed your choice of project for the ACORN programme?
3. What problem(s) do you seek to address through the project?
4. What population is the project targeting?
5. Is the project directed at a particular tribe or faith? Please, give details.
6. Did your organisation conduct a baseline evaluation at commencement of the project?
7. What is the geographic area of coverage of your ACORN funded project?
8. Is the project implementation being guided by a particular policy document?
9. What are the assumptions of your project under the ACORN programme?
10. Have the assumptions been proven right or wrong since implementation of the project?
11. Does the project implementation require a collective action? Please, be specific?
12. What specific activities does the project entail?
13. Are these activities based on the social norms approach in anti-corruption?
14. What methods and tools are adopted in implementing the social norms-based interventions?
15. What are the anticipated outcomes of the adopted social norms-based interventions?
16. Has any progress been made or recorded in implementation of the project?
17. If response to 16 above is in the affirmative, is the recorded progress different from your anticipated outcomes?

18. Please, tell us about the progress in implementing the social norms-based interventions in detail.

19. What are the barriers to effective implementation of the project?

20. How do you intend to address the barriers?

21. What are the risks involved in implementing the social norms approach?

22. What mitigation plan was developed to address these risks?

23. What language is predominant in the regions in which the project is being implemented?

24. To what extent do your activities involve any or all of the following key influencers?

(a) Media (b) Celebrities (c) Traditional leaders (d) Religious leaders

25. How do your social norms based interventions affect other components of the ACORN programme?

26. Does your organisation have a working relationship with other partners in the ACORN programme?

27. In what areas or sectors are you collaborating?

28. What are the possibilities of enhancing cooperation among the ACORN partners' projects?

29. Do you have any question for us?

THANK YOU!

Appendix V



Monitoring and Evaluation Related Interview Guide for ACORN Partner Experts

Dear sir or madam,

This interview is further to the implementation of the project, 'Applying Social Norms in Anti-Corruption Programming', as part of 'Supportive Society and Social Norms' component of the 'Anti-Corruption in Nigeria' (ACORN) programme. We seek to understand the social norms based interventions by the partners in the ACORN programme.

You are, therefore, requested to respond to the questions below, according to your knowledge and experience of the subject matter. Please, be assured that your answers will be treated in confidence as the data will be used for the study purpose only.

Organisation	
Address	
Date of Consultation / Meeting	
Venue of Consultation / Meeting	
Leader of Engagement Team	

1. What are the specific objectives of the social norms project being implemented by your client?
2. What monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework is adopted in the project?
3. What are the baselines and milestones of the social norms project?
4. What are the indicators for measuring the progress and impact of the project?
5. Do you think the M&E framework is effective in determining the project impact?
6. Do you think the M&E framework will ensure accountability to the donor agency?
7. What lessons have you documented in the course of your application of the M&E framework?
8. Do you think the M&E framework of the ACORN programme appropriately captures the social norms?
9. Is there any relationship between the various projects by partners under the ACORN programme?
10. What form of coordination currently exists amongst the ACORN programme partners?
11. What kind of framework can be adopted for coordinating the various projects implemented by the ACORN partners?
12. What is your understanding of sustainability as part of the framework for monitoring and evaluating the various social norms interventions under the ACORN programme?
13. Do you have any question for us?

THANK YOU!

Appendix VI

List of Engaged Stakeholders

<i>S/n</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Designation</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Date</i>
1	Ms. Sonia Warner	Senior Governance Advisor	DFID, Abuja	Dec. 18, 2019
2	Mr. Newton Otsemaye	Programme Officer	ActionAid Nigeria, Abuja	Dec. 19, 2019
3	Mr. Kolawale Oluwadare	Deputy Executive Director	SERAP, Lagos	Jan. 17, 2020
4	Dr. Udy Okon	Executive Director	YAF, Abuja	Jan. 19, 2020
5	Samson Doma	M&E Adviser	YAF, Abuja	Jan. 22, 2020
6	Rev. David Ugolor	Executive Director	ANEEJ, Benin City	Feb. 7, 2020
7	Mr. Leo Atakpu	Deputy Executive Director	ANEEJ, Benin City	Feb. 7, 2020
8	Mr. Innocent Edemhanria	Programme Officer	ANEEJ, Benin City	Feb. 7, 2020
9	Ms. Sandra Eguagie	Programme/ M&E Officer	ANEEJ, Benin City	Feb. 7, 2020
10	Dr. Abdulkarim Lawal,	M&E Consultant	Itad Ltd., Abuja	Feb. 7, 2020
11	Ms. Sandra Eguagie	Programme/ M&E Officer	ANEEJ, Benin City	Mar. 17, 2020

Annexure VII

'Cases of changed norms for anti-corruption'

S/n	State	Established Norms	The Problem	Objectives/ Strategies for Action	Tools and Techniques Used	Outcomes/ Impact	Lessons Learned
1	Egypt	Public officers who refused to take bribes were perceived as dogmatic and inflexible. "Petty corruption" and small bribes were not haraam but "facilitation fees"	Despite media coverage, the core of the problem was not tackled; there was an abusive public service and a citizenship who was willing to pay bribes.	Shayfeen.com deployed UNCAC as the main tool for its campaign, and formed the Egyptians against Corruption in October 2006.	*UNCAC whistleblower protection. *Egypt's slot in CPI •Corruption kills slogan	*Support from 100 opinion leaders. *25,000 people voted for anti-corruption.	Active citizenship, conscious public officials, and civil society movement was successful.
2	Georgia	Severe misuse of state funding in the university, and tolerated corruption. Professors took bribes to compensate for low salary. Students paid bribes to receive a diploma without passing exams.	Inefficiency in educational worsened by corruption. Least qualified gained admission to the university due to <i>chackobili</i> (corrupt) oral and written examinations.	A group of second-year students shared one idea that something needed to be changed. Campaign focused on transparent election of student leaders.	*Contacts enabled use of NGO material resources. *Journalists interviewed activists, write stories. *Students demanded quality materials.	*Student self-rule gained popularity. *Seven people grew to 30 dedicated activists. **"Official" student union invalidated.	Central to the success were core group unity until end of campaign, and information Exchange.
3	Tunisia	The Tunisia story centres on <i>rashwa</i> , paying a bribe to access public service. This had trickled down from the Ben Ali family through the ruling party and down into society at large.	In 24 years, Tunisia wealth was left in the hands of few connected to former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali's family, and that of his wife, the Trabelsis.	More than 5,000 people participated in the funeral procession in honour of Mohammed Bouzazi. It showed that people were fed up with corruption.	Social media was used to document riots and share news, including the presidential airplane and "unofficial" trips.	*President Ali fled the country after 23 years in power. *Protests in Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Bahrain, and Libya.	*A tiny spark can ignite a powerful blaze, as shown in disgruntled citizens who took power from autocratic rule.
4	Philippines	The public in the Philippines has accepted as a way of life (i.e. <i>kalakaran</i>). This is because corruption is widespread in the country.	Limited resources available to the city of Oroquieta had been severally wasted. The city had weak mechanisms for curbing corruption. Citizens lacked a voice against corruption.	ECOLINK's work covered measure of funds wasted on vehicle; develop a local culture of vigilance against corruption; and use media to mobilise citizens	*Community radio programme <i>Bantay Kurpasyon</i> in Oroquieta. *Billboards displaying hotlines erected in major cities for citizens' use.	*More than 600 people joined programme's Facebook page. *Misuse of govt. vehicles eradicated in the province.	Go-betweens, such as ECOLINK and the FM station, can act as catalysts in mobilisation against corruption.
5	Uganda	Police was declared the most corrupt institution in South-Western Uganda. This perception was informed by a public that was used to police bribes and abuse.	Ugandans were unmindful of the effects of police abuse and corruption. Just as the public needed awareness of the police laws, the latter also needed to improve its integrity.	Uganda NGO, NAFODU launched campaigns was launched to generate awareness on police corruption.	*Cooperation with the Ugandan Police Force. *Information campaign. *Established monitoring, vigilante committees.	*Increased corruption reporting to NAFODU. *Most citizens had a wider view of what corruption entails.	Media programme against corruption cannot be operated solely on voluntary work. Full-time staff are needed.
6	Guatemala	Guatemala is characterised by endemic corruption, which serves to enable illicit activities by violent groups for money making and weaponry.	Government was too weak to confront the powerful criminal group, 'CIACS', which, in 2002, took open violent action against human rights defenders, journalists, judges, prosecutors, and politicians.	Local citizens' movement emerged in Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, which applied campaigns and civic actions to break up corruption.	Strong coalitions were built to conduct a wide and creative range of nonviolent actions, such as civil disobedience, demonstrations, and monitoring of spending.	Violent intimidation, kidnapping, and murder, nonetheless, civil resistance is ongoing, and solidarity networks have been set up.	*Credibility in communication is key to success. This applies to interest groups at all levels. *Creation of an alternative system of civil resistance.

S/n	State	Established Norms	The Problem	Objectives/ Strategies for Action	Tools and Techniques Used	Outcomes/ Impact	Lessons Learned
7	Turkey	Corruption due to a nationwide crime syndicate, involving paramilitary entities, drug traffickers, the mafia, businesses, government officials, and lawmakers.	Turkish government applied harsh measures on protesting students, including force and restrictive measures to quell civic dissent.	A group of professionals and civil society advocates expressed mobilised the masses to demand end parliamentary immunity, and impunity in general.	The Citizen Initiative for Constant Light was born out of this idea. This followed a careful strategy for a simple, low-risk action.	Government forced to resign on Feb. 28, 1997, during Constant Light Campaign. Parliament approved a new government.	Civil resistance is a force for reform, accountability, and transparency. Provides means to fight corruption.
8	India (1)	Indian public officials had taken advantage of the huge time involved in citizens' access to basic services to request 'hidden fees' for quick services.	Bribes were being paid by as much as 50% of Indians to get any type of job done in a public office. A professor was serially harassed by demands.	The NGO, Fifth Pillar promotes the use of zero-rupee notes to fight corruption by shaming officers who ask for bribes.	'Eliminate corruption at all levels', and 'I promise to neither accept nor give a bribe' were written on the zero-rupee notes.	Some people who received the zero-rupee notes returned all the bribes solicited.	Ordinary people are more willing to protest when they are supported by an organisation.
9	India (2)	Public officers are wont to demand a bribe to provide services to citizens in India.	Society defined by anger and frustration in corruption. Fear of retaliation also debars citizens from raising voices against corruption.	The NGO, Janaagraha established an online platform to encourage citizens to act through a simple, easy process.	Website, 'I paid a bribe' was launched on August 15, 2010.	Transport Chief issued show-cause notices to 20 senior officers based on bribes paid.	With the right evidence, people are more confident in resisting bribe-giving.
10	Hong Kong	Reporting corruption in Hong Kong was simply suicidal and an invitation to victimisation. The norm was either accepting a bribe or minding one's own business.	The Anti-Corruption Office, which was part of the Police faced public distrust.	Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) enlisted public support, using community education.	*Sacred rule of silence on origin of complaints. *Regular surveys to gauge the public mood.	*Changes in public perception of corruption. *Effective application of anti-corruption.	Anti-corruption requires investigation, prevention, public education.
11	Argentina	Citizens feel it is their duty to serve the public officials, who often command entitlement or benefits from service beneficiaries.	A fertile climate for corruption. Inefficient judicial performance in investigation. No provision for citizen's access to legal information.	An NGO, ACIJ launched an investigation campaign to analyse corruption handling by judiciary, via 'Citizens Action and Anti-Corruption'.	*ACIJ adopted advocacy and litigation tools. *Advanced a case to the Supreme Court. *Also used online interactive database.	*Community of practice created. *Awareness of legal rules on access to justice. *3,500 hits per month on blog and database.	Citizens' movement in anti-corruption is assured when they are informed and aware.
12	Brazil	Brazil's political system and citizenship tolerated parliamentary crimes, such as money laundering and corruption. Candidates running for political office could have a criminal record.	Corruption and crime were entrenched in Brazil due to lapses in the country's laws, which allowed convicted candidates to run for office in the following election year.	Movement for Fighting Electoral Corruption worked to introduce legislation to qualify only candidates who had clean record.	*Massive campaign to collect physical signatures along with voter IDs. *Clean Record Bill enacted.	*All convicted of crimes disqualified from political office for 8 years. *330 candidates faced disqualification.	Corrupt politicians can be forced to step down with popular uprisings though strong coalition.
13	United Kingdom	"An entrenched set of unethical norms about expenses" was exploited by the British MPs who claimed reimbursement for expenses outside the allowance rules. Permissive norm supported by a disengaged public.	Green Book provides for MPs' ensure reimbursements for costs properly incurred on duties. However, details of MP's expenses were simply unknown to the public.	*Newly enacted freedom of information law inspired two journalist and a freedom of information advocate.	*The Daily Telegraph serialised a leaked copy.	*Those found guilty were punished. *389 MPs ordered to refund £1.12 million. *More than 120 declined re-election.	Freedom of information laws are useful only when citizens are aware of such laws, and put them to use.

Source: Panth (2011)

Annexure VIII

‘Summary of social norms interventions by ACORN partners’

S/n	Subject	DFID	ActionAid Nigeria	ANEEJ	SERAP	YAF	Comment(s)
1	Project title	Anti-Corruption in Nigeria Programme (ACORN)	Strengthening Citizens Capacity to Resist Corruption, SCRAP-C	Monitoring of Recovered Assets in Nigeria Through Transparency and Accountability, MANTRA	Nigerian Anti-Corruption Social Norms Project	Strengthening Youth Participation Against Corruption, Y-PAC	Different projects but one programme.
2	Goal(s)	Reduce corruption in Nigeria, in view of its impact on development.	Address citizens’ attitude towards corruption in Nigeria.	*Ensure return of stolen assets stashed in the West. *Strengthen citizens’ capacity to ‘keep an eye’ on returned loot. *Ensure returned loot is used for purpose meant.	*Investigate why people behave the way they do concerning corruption. *Build a new way of looking at corruption.	Engage youths to become active advocates in the fight against corruption.	All partners’ projects are directed at achieving the overall goal(s) of ACORN.
3	Coverage	National	North-west (Jigawa, Kaduna and Kano) South-west (Lagos) South-east (Enugu) South-south (A-Ibom) North-central (FCT)	*Six geo-political zones. *Covered 19 states as at Dec 2019.	Six geo-political zones	Akwa-Ibom, Cross Rivers, Kano, Lagos, Rivers, FCT	MANTRA appears to have a wide coverage, compared to other projects.
4	Policy framework	Nigerian (national), UK (national), and international	*Emanating from 2017 baseline studies. *ActionAid’s internal policies *NACS, FEC approved *UNCAC, London Summit Commitments	*Internal policies *Report of scoping study *Contract documents *Business case for ACORN *NACS *UNCAC	*Outcomes two studies *NACS *Concept paper by a consultant	*Outcome of KAP study *NACS *Chatham House Report	There is a similarity in the documents guiding the programme and projects.
5	Assumptions	*Shift in citizens’ behaviour required for social norms change. *ACORN is tied to election and democratic governance, and elections belong to all citizens. *Society component is most important.	*People are docile, and are not active. *Context- and sector-specifics of social norms of corruption. *Problem of addressing corruption is huge. *There is a legal definition of corruption. *Citizens must work the legal context to achieve results. *Belief that everyone in Nigeria is corrupt.	*Everybody years for action to be taken against corruption. *There would be sufficient resources to drive anti-corruption work. *Anti-corruption stance of APC-led FG will provide an enabling environment for MANTRA. *When corruption is reduced, poverty will also reduce.	*More Nigerians feel bad about corruption, *A larger percentage of Nigerians would not take steps against corruption. *Nigerians can actually take steps to reduce corruption.	*People would fight corruption if there is social marketing, people are mobilised and informed about corruption, and a platform is created for young people to reach and support. *Youths are not being engaged because they not mobilised.	The assumptions point to the pervasiveness corruption in Nigeria. Most assumptions point to the fact that they are being proven right.

6	Collective action	Required	Works within the citizens' space	Everybody is working collaboratively to achieve results.	Citizens have to be receptive of the project.	Y-PAC's activities involve students and youth groups.	Focus should be on social networks. Changes occur through networks.
7	Anticipated outcome(s)	Anti-corruption would become a norm. Changing norms is related to trust.	There would be a social rejection of people involved in corruption	*Behaviour change leads to stronger resistance to corruption *Individual and collective action that would pose resistance to corruption.	*People will change their behaviour that encourages corruption over time.	*More youths would begin to resist corruption through engagement.	In anticipating that anti-corruption becomes a norm, some unexpected results are being achieved.
8	Activities		*Media engagement *Citizens' engagement *Policy engagement *Private sector engagement	*Monitoring, advocacy *Training, policy dialogue *Stakeholders engagement *Town hall meetings *Dissemination events *Public lectures	*Research *Reporting *Launching *Advocacy *Educative, *Reformative	*Capacity building *Project management *Research.	Partners have used different activities to drive their projects.
9	Method(s) and tool(s)	DFID lacked the expertise to suggest methods and tools.	*Messaging/campaigns, fliers in branded bags. *Social audit by citizens, or 'score card'	*Collective action; *infographics *Press release *Platform of traditional and religious leaders	*Education *Media engagement *Info graphs of reports *Animation *Workshops for students, govt. officials	*Capacity building *Technology	There are similarities in the methods and tools being deployed.
10	Progress made	Still at the information stage. Progress in creating accountability hurdles	More citizens now report corruption, and they want to join anti-corruption campaign.	*Abacha II (\$32.5 million) not re-looted. *Returned loot utilisation helps to attain SDGs. *Bayelsa changed decision on use of Alamiyeseigh a loot (\$900,000). *Passage of NFIU *Official Gazette on Asset Recovery. *Beneficiaries of NCTP are blowing whistle on corrupt officials. *Delta awaiting return of Ibori loot *Delta and Edo have joined the OGP	*SERAP intends to work with NOA in disseminating report findings. *Currently at post-launch advocacy of report.	*Citizens organise training and advocacy sessions. *Protagonists of vote buying and selling renounce involvement.	Social norms change takes generation. Anti-corruption is for all.

11	Barriers	Lack of access to quality information in Nigeria. There is misinformation. Isolated programming. Biased investigation. Weak public confidence, Baseline is extremely low.	*Cognitive barrier in the North due to high level of illiteracy. *Policy barriers pertain to the faulty nature of the Nigerian laws.	*Policy reforms not directly under control, due to stakeholders' interest. *Entrenched attitudes and norms found in citizens' apathy towards progress being made.	*Late release of funds. *Lack of funds for the partner govt. agency.	*Strong opposition from school authorities.	Messages and reference networks that would resonate with the people and their kind of lives are needed.
12	Response to barriers	DFID not engaging politically, but responds at the programmatic levels. No lobbying to avoid diplomatic row. Strong advocacy, reputation scrutiny needed.	*Identify where people aggregate, examine their common belief, and thereafter insert anti-corruption campaign.	*Citizens are involved in monitoring disbursement of Abacha II *Training of citizens and CSOs *Media coverage and periodic release of information to the public.	DFID's mandate to SERAP does not cover building of technical capacity for agency. *SERAP is racing against the clock, although nothing can be done for NOA.	*YAF rides on the back of students' association to pursue the goals of Y-PAC,	Barriers are being addressed differently.
13	Risks	It goes against the flow, which is 'corruption pays'. Therefore, it may not work.	*Compromise of the foot soldiers. *Legal framework does not contain a social norm perspective. *'Short-termism'	*Persons with interest in funds that are re-looted. *General insecurity in the country, e.g. BH *Spread of negative information.	*Insecurity in some parts of the North. *Past experience and mere perception.	*Difficult to work in democratic settings. *Govt. agencies sometimes pose huge risks.	The study points to the generality in the risks involved in anti-corruption work.
14	Mitigating risks	DFID does close monitoring of ACORN. Established robust M&E.	*Relies on internal systems *Pushes for legal reform *Involve people and partners in project design	*ANEEJ has developed a risk register. *ANEEJ also has a risk matrix for the MANTRA. *In some cases, work is suspended to avoid risks.	*SERAP gives identification tags to its field researchers. * *Uses convenience work in the hot-bed of conflict. *Consultant built in questions for past experience and mere perception.	*Exercise patience because working with government agencies requires a lot of patience.	Different forms of risk mitigation are being deployed.
15	Key influencers	Citizens have the power to decide what behaviour they want to adopt.	*Frank Dunga is social media influencer *Femi Durotoye has also been engaged *Moral institutions engagement *Town and gown model	*Involves media (social and conventional) *Engage with traditional rulers, religious leaders and government officials at all levels.	*Media ranks first. *Religious leaders rank second. *Traditional rulers rank third. *Celebrities will come fourth.	*Tuface *Simi *P-Square. *Religious leaders *Traditional rulers	Influencers play key roles in driving the partners' projects.
16	Partners	ActionAid, ANEEJ, SERAP, YAF, UNODC, ASI	ANEEJ, SERAP, YAF	ActionAid, SERAP, YAF, UNODC	*Worked with ANEEJ, ActionAid Nigeria, ASI, and UNODC as members of the National Working Committee.	SERAP,	Programmatic activities should have a percentage for collaboration before approval by DFID.
17	Top Consideration	*Move from inaction to action, focusing on youths. *Gain deeper understanding of the partners' engagements: (1) How has AAN worked with various groups? And how do their M&E affect changes in social norms? (2) How does ANEEJ's monitoring of the Cash Transfers make beneficiaries more in anti-corruption? (3) How did YAF's programme enable movement from institutions to processes? (4) How will SERAP's actions mobilise youths?	Difference between this study and the Chatham House report.	*Envisages more work with UNODC in the area of data generation to inform intervention in NSIP. *Intends to work with ActionAid Nigeria in addressing some of the challenges in the NSIP. *Working with AAN on constituency projects. *Gaining insights of the thinking of other partners towards improving social norms-based approach.	Purpose of this exercise	*It is important to capture real achievement by partners.	*Enhancing cooperation among ACORN require strengthening the mechanism for joint work. *Identify partners with strong peoples' voices and clarify.

Annexure IX

Draft Work Plan for Applying Social Norms in Anti-Corruption Programme

Project duration: Six months

Contract start date: Sep. 19, 2019

Activity/Process Deliverable Description	Due Date (Up until)	Duration (No. of days)
Preliminaries Meeting with project partners Clarification and firming up of agreement with ANEEJ's ED and DED Meeting with ANEEJ's Senior Research and Social Norms Advisor Inception report (including a work plan)	Sep. 30, 2019	Two weeks (14 days)
Implementation of Project Objective 1: <i>Research on Social Norms Approach in Anti-Corruption Programming</i> - Theoretical and historical background - Formulate research question(s) - Identify all existing literature on the subject matter - Case review(s) in the global north and global south - Excavate success stories and lessons learnt - Write a paper on the application of social norms in anti-corruption programming - Submit a research paper	Nov. 4, 2019	Five weeks (35 days)
Progress Review	Nov. 11, 2019	One week (Seven days)
Implementation of Project Objective 2: <i>Scoping Study on Application of Social Norms Approach in the ACORN Programme</i> - Formulate research question(s) - Request documents from the ACORN partners - Chart data on the various social norms-based activities of partner projects - Design interview schedule, based on assumptions, methods..... - Visit and hold practical interviews with partners to understand their interventions. - Evaluate the context of social norms interventions in anticorruption in Nigeria - Report writing - Preliminary report of scoping study - Peer review of scoping study - Submit final report of scoping study on social norm interventions under ACORN	Dec. 16, 2019	Five weeks (35 days)

Progress Review	Dec. 23, 2019	One week (Seven days)
Activity/Process Deliverable Description	Due Date (Up until)	Duration (No. of days)
Implementation of Project Objective 3: Monitoring and Evaluation-related Tasks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Revisit the issues raised during interviews with ACORN project partners - Identify the M&E teams of individual projects and the broader ACORN Programme - Review the social norms approach adopted by the project partners - Review the baseline and milestones of each intervention - Review the indicators used in measuring progress and impact of social norms approach - Determine the effectiveness of the M&E frameworks for social norms at both levels - Analyse data and documents - Make recommendations for enhanced work on social norms under ACORN programme - Report writing and submission 	Feb. 3, 2020	Six weeks (42 days)
Progress Review:	Feb. 10, 2020	One week (Seven days)
Implementation of Project Objective 4: Cooperation, Coordination and Ownership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contact ANEEJ and ACORN partners on progress made thus far - Examine the social norms approach adopted by partners in the ACORN programme - Excavate the similarities and differences in individual programming - Design and recommend a framework for collective action and ownership - Submit a draft framework for cooperation and coordination - Hold a session with the partners 	Mar. 16, 2020	Five weeks (35 days)
Final Project Review	Mar. 23, 2020	One week (Seven days)

S/N	Including submission to ANEEJ	Due Date	Remarks
1	Inception memo	Sep. 30, 2019	Including work plan
2	Submission of a research paper on the application of social norms in anti-corruption programming	Nov. 4, 2019	Submit a review: Nov. 11, 2019
3	Submit final report of scoping study on social norm interventions under the ACORN	Dec. 16, 2019	Submit a review: Dec. 23, 2019
4	Submit final report on assessment of M&E requirements of the social norms components	Feb. 3, 2020	Submit a review: Feb. 10, 2020
5	Submit a framework for cooperation and coordination of social norms interventions by ACORN partners	Mar. 16, 2020	Submit a review: Mar. 23, 2020

Appendix X

A Framework for Cooperation and Coordination of Partners in Application of Social Norms



1. Introduction

The general purpose of this framework is to re-think the numerous challenges to effective cooperation and coordination of social norms activities by the principal partners under ACORN. In the course of the interviews, the stakeholders pointed to a number of barriers and risks. DFID's major response is to avoid engaging politically, while the partners also adopt measures to address the barriers and mitigate risks. There is an existing relationship between the ACORN projects as evidenced in joint programming. DFID has retained the services of the M&E Consultant, Itad Limited to ensure a functional relationship amongst the partners, which would extend to second-tier partners. Also, there is a steering committee meeting, wherein critical decisions are taken to affect the project coordination. However, some partners are of the opinion that no coordination exists amongst the ACORN partners. This underscores the need for a more pragmatic approach to achieve cooperation and coordination in the social norms-based interventions of ACORN projects. This framework notes the adaptive nature of ACORN, with relevant points extracted for subsequent review of ACORN's M&E framework. Therefore, it is not a replacement for ACORN's M&E framework. Its validation shall arise from engagements with the key stakeholders of ACORN.



2. Implementation

The implementation strategy shall be to harness the energies, strengths and opportunities of the principal partners towards the achievement of the set goals of this framework. Central to the implementation shall be a review of the original visions and survival of the principal partners. This shall be compared with the assumptions, expectations and ambitions behind the ACORN programme and individual projects. The results of this exercise shall be used to determine the extent to which the framework can facilitate the cooperation and coordination in applying social norms in anti-corruption programming.



3. Institutional Capacity

From the review, the M&E application serves to build the capacity of partners, such as training on report writing to focus on concrete results, but there are in search of more capacity development. In consideration of the existing measures, the M&E Consultant, Itad Limited shall be supported to establish an ACORN Cooperation and Coordination Committee (A3C). The functions of the A3C shall be to monitor the implementation of the framework as well as regulate the activities of the project partners. In addition, the A3C shall support the development of social norms research and training with a genuine focus on cooperation and coordination.



4. Review

DFID under the banner of ACORN shall be responsible for the review of commitments to the targets of this framework, which would serve as a roadmap to determine their achievements. The framework shall be revised within each of the two dimensions of 'cooperation' and 'coordination' and eight indicators.



5. Practical Measure

The practical measure of this framework is captured in Appendix XI (as attached). The indicators are basically challenges arising from the cooperation and coordination points of ACORN implementation. The goals are set targets in response to the challenges. The activities would require 'keeping a tab'. Responsibility 'column' explains who should ensure that the activities are being carried out. The schedule suggests the time-frame, and the results are expectations from the implementation.

Practical Measure

S/n	Dimension	Indicators	Goal(s)	Activities	Responsibility	Schedule	Result(s)
1	Cooperation	Disparate policy documents	Work with a common set of policy documents	-Hold session on policy framework - Share partners' policy documents - Agree on best practice documents	DFID/ SRO Partners	3-6 months	-Effective project implementation -Common position on ACORN
		Insufficient knowledge of partners' projects on social norms	Have a shared knowledge of all social norms-based projects	-Support alliance among partners -Produce data to inform social norms -Work with same set of influencers -Engage second-tier partners	DFID/ SRO Partners	4-8 months	-Partners are aware of each other's projects -Joint project implementation
		Individual action by principal partners	Base all projects on collective action	-Train on social norms interventions -Co-implement social projects	DFID Partners	1-2 years	-Group support for social norms interventions
		Apathy towards partners' projects	-Credible support for project -Extended project duration	-Incentivise partners on all projects -Allow budget for collaboration -Ensure proper implementation	DFID Partners	1-2 years	-Project ownership by all partners
2	Coordination	Insufficient tracking of project activities	-Effective monitoring -Implement novel projects	-Regular visits to project sites -Hold periodic review meetings -Ensure execution of novel projects	DFID/ SRO A3C	1-2 years	-Appropriate results -Effective social norms programming
		Short project life	Involve partners in future programme design	Ensure the decision-makers in partner NGOs are involved	DFID/ SRO A3C	Tbd	-Extended project life -Sustainability in social norms campaigns
		Poor communication	Design effective communication tools	-Ensure revision of M&E framework -Share documents among partners	Itad Ltd A3C	1-2 years	-Effective communication between DFID and ACORN partners
		Differences in methods and tools adopted	-Set learning for partners -Match methods and tools -Train on methods and tools	-Hold review sessions on methods -Ensure use of coordination points -Ensure collective use of robust tools	DFID/ SRO Itad Ltd. Partners	6-9 months	-Adoption of similar methods and tools

Baseline: July 2020, unless otherwise stated or altered by the UK's DFID/ ACORN and principal partners

Timeline: 24 months

Midterm Review: 12 months

Source: Developed for ANEEJ (2020)

